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INTRODUCTION
"The records of this Committee prove beyond possibility of successful contra-
diction that restrictive practices are used by some business organizations not
only to destroy competition but to regiment men. . . On the broad scale,
therefore, this Committet recommends the maintenance of free, competitive
enterprise by the effective suppression of the restrictive practices which have
always been recognized as evil. . . . But generally over the field of industry
and finance we must revive and strengthen competition if we wish to preserve
and make workable our traditional system of free enterprise. . . It is gen-
erally agreed, for example, that competition must be maintained as the prin-
ciple of our economy, for everyone seems to acknowledge that the alternative
to competition is some form of concentrated government authority which might
easily destroy democracy .... It will avail us nothing to carry a gigantic de-
fense program to a successful conclusion if in so doing we lose sight of the
basic philosophy of our American economy-a competitive system of private
capitalism." '
IT has long been recognized that patent litigation involves the scope
of legally sanctioned monopolies.2 Anti-trust actions by their very name
denote the dual problem of monopoly and competition. Likewise, trade-
mark and' unfair competition suits concern the relative spheres of mo-
nopoly and competition in our economy, since the question to be adjudi-
cated is whether or not one party will be permitted to exclude another
from using particular -marks or business methods and thereby secure
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. TNEC FINAL REPORT AND RECOMIMENDATIONS (1941) 7, 9, 15, 25, 35. "Those
people, in and out of the halls of government, who encourage the growing restriction of
competition either by active efforts or by passive resistance to sincere attempts to change
the trend, are shouldering a terrific responsibility. Consciously, or unconsciously, they are
working for centralized business and financial control. Consciously, or unconsciously, they
are therefore either working for control of the Government itself by business and finance
or the other alternative-a growing concentration of public power in the Government to
cope with such concentration of private power. The enforcement of free competition is
the least regulation business can expect." THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANK-
LIN D. ROOSEVELT (1938) 313.
2. For a treatment of the historical background of patents as monopolies, see HAM-
ILTON, TNEC REP., PATENTS AND FREE ENTaiuR'SE, Monograph 31 (1941) cc. II, 11.
514
MONOPOLY VERSUS COMPETITION
exclusive rights for itself with respect to these marks or methods.' As
Circuit Judge Jerome Frank pointedly stated the issue in a recent trade-
mark action: ". . . the legal protection of trade-names . . creates
lawful monopolies, immunities from competition." 4 Since patents, anti-
trust problems, trademark and unfair competition questions are mani-
festations of the same central problem, doctrinal developments within
any of these areas may serve to illuminate and explain decisions and
trends within interrelated areas.
During the past decade there have been within these allied fields devel-
opments of outstanding importance and significance. In this article an
attempt will be made to outline the major trends in each of these branches
of law-usually treated by writers and courts as separate and distinct
parts of our legal structure-and to demonstrate that there is a dominant
motif which serves to weave together into a consistent and harmonious
pattern, as well as to explain, the developments which have taken place
3. WzasTm's NEw INTEIATIONAL DIcriOARy (2d ed. 1934) defines monpoly as
"An exclusive possession of the trade in some article or exercise of some business.. Ed-
ward S. Rogers, dean of practitioners in this field, has argued that trademarks, unlil:e
patents and copyrights-which he admits are monopolies created by law-are "quite a
different thing. There is no element of monopoly involved at all . .. A trademarl:
precludes the idea of monopoly." Roavms, GooD-WiLL, TR"AF ArMS AND U:u'Am TrnM-
IXG (1914) 51, 52. At a subsequent point in the same work, however, he admits that an
exclusive right to the use of a mark "is worth something to the producer of the goads.
. It eliminates competition." Id. at 56.
Likewise, Handler and Pickett argue that these suits do not involve a claim of total
monopoly, since only exclusive rights with respect to the use of such marks as names
are sought in these litigations, and non-denominative use is still open to the defendants.
See Handler and Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade-Morks-An Analysis and Syniesis: I
(1930) 30 COL L. REV. 168. But since the central issue in these actions is the right of
the plaintiff to exclude the defendant from using its mark in a denominative sense, it can-
not be denied that the plaintiff is seeking a monopoly over the only thing that is of any
importance to the parties, namely, a denominative use of the mark. The nun-denominative
use is obviously of no concern to the plaintiff and not of sufficient value to a defendant
to be worth litigating about.
4. Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F. (2d) 955, 957 (C. C. A.
2d, 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 758. (1943). Similarly, Kurt Borchardt, in a suggestive
article, remarks: "It can safely be said that trade-marks, like patents and copyrights, have
their monopolistic aspects, because it is one of the functions of trade-marks to lift the pro-
duct bearing a mark out of its general class and to place it into a class of its own, thus
eliminating competition of other goods, because the public believes that 'there is nothing
"just as good."' [citing CHA MBER Aix, TUE THEOrY oF 'MONOPOLISTIC CoMrPrrzTo:N
(1933) 57 et seq., 204 et seq.]." Borchardt, Are Trademarhs an Antitrust Problem
(1943) 31 GEo. L. J. 245, 246. For an able demonstration of the use of trademarks to
effectuate cartel agreements dividing territories between competitors, see Diggins, Trade-
Marks in Restraint of Trade (1944) 32 GEo. L. J. 113: "The significance and effective-
ness of trade-marks in restricting competition can hardly be over-emphasized. Together
with patents, trade-marks are included among the chief legal sanctions under which car-
tels have established, maintained and enforced restraints of trade."
1944]
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within each. The key to both this pattern and the motif is to be found
in the emergence of the present Supreme Court, seven of whose nine
Justices have been appointed within the past seven years," as a champion
of free competition as the fundamental characteristic of our economic
structure. One fundamental theme runs through its decisions: an insist-
ence that the "public interest" shall be considered the dominant interest
in these matters and that this interest is best served by a freely com-
petitive economic system from which have been removed as many mo-
nopolilstic restrictions as possible.
Nevertheless, the process by which the trend has been given expression
has developed in a different fashion in the patent and anti-trust fields as
compared with the field of trademark and unfair 'competition claims.
Major developments within the patent and anti-trust fields have stemmed
directly from opinions of the Supreme Court, usually reversals of circuit
court rulings. Within the field of trademarks and unfair competition,
however, only one decision of the Supreme Court during the past decade
involved a delimitation of the scope of permissible competition in the use
of marks and business methods. The Court has made its influence felt
5. In the order of their appointment, they are Messrs. Justices Black, Reed, Doug-
las, Frankfurter, Murphy, Jackson, and Rutledge. Moreover. during this period Mr. jus-
tice Stone has been elevated to the Chief Justiceship. Within the past decade, there has
also been occasion for a large, number of appointments to the various circuit courts of
appeals as well as to the district courts. During this period of time approximately sixty
per cent of the present number of circuit judges and fifty-six per cent of the district
court judges have been appointed. A table showing the number of appointments to the
various circuit courts of appeals follows. These figures do not include the judges of the
Appellate Court of the District of Columbia:
Number of Percentages of
Present Judges Present Judges
Total Number Appointed Since Appointed Since
Circuit Court of Judges Jan. 1,1934 Jan. 1,1934
1 3 3 100 %
2 6 2 333
3 5 5 100
4 3 1 33Y3
5 6 4 6621
6 6 4 663
7 5 2 40
8 7 3 420
9 7 5 713
10 4 2 50
52 31 60
6. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111 (1938). Two other Supreme
Court decisions dealt with trademark questions; but in these the issue before the Court
was not the right to the exclusive use of marks or business methods. In Armstrong Paint
& Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U. S. 315 (1938), the Court was called upon
to decide the limits of the federal courts' jurisdiction with respect to actions involving
claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition, where the claims for trademark
infringement were predicated upon a 1920 Trademark Act registration, and the claims for
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by declining to review decisions of the various circuit courts of appeals
dealing with these questions. It is proposed to examine these decisions-
as well as a few equally significant cases in this field where certiorari was
not applied for-and to demonstrate that: (a) in a number of these cases
the circuit courts of appeals themselves framed the issues in terms of
the monopoly sought by the plaintiff and based their decision upon the
desirability of the freest possible competition; (b) the results in all these
cases are in harmony with those arrived at by the Supreme Court not only
in its single decision within this field, but likewise with those reached in
the patent and anti-trust cases where in disapproving of lower court rul-
ings, the Justices expressed their views upon the relative spheres of mo-
nopoly and competition within our economy.
This article will not be concerned with the question whether or not the
Supreme Court has correctly decided that the "public interest" should be
primary in these fields or that it is best served under present conditions
by such a competitive economy. These first premises deserve wide dis-
cussion on the part of all groups within our society. This article, how-
ever, shall be devoted to a descriptive and analytical presentation of the
developments within each of the fields of law under discussion, as well
as their basic interrelation, rather than to consideration of the merits or
demerits of these first premises.
unfair competition upon facts similar to those which constituted the basis for the claim of
trademark infringement. In the recent case of 'Mishavaka Rubber & Xroolen MIfg. Co. v.
Kresge, 316 U. S. 203 (1942), the only issue before the Court was the interpretation of
section 16 of the 1905 Trademark Act relating to the burden of proof in an accounting
where infringement was assumed to be established. The case was decided by a majority
of four Justices, with three dissenting, and Chief Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Roberts not
participating. Although the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter does contain some dicta
setting forth a broad view as to the rights of trademark owners, these views cannot be
considered those of the Court or a decision of that tribunal upon the scope of the rights
of a trademark owner or the bases of his right to protection. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
himself recognized at the outset of his opinion that the issue of infringement was not
before the Court: ". . . we brought the case here solely to review the provisions of the
decree dealing with the measure of profits and damages for the infringement found by
the two lower courts. Whether there was such an infringement as to entitle the petitioner
to the remedies provided by the federal trademark laws is therefore not open here." Id.
at 204-05. The sentences immediately following, although they cannot in any sense be con-
sidered representative of the views of the Court, must be taken into account in estimating
those of Mir. Justice Frankfurter: "The protection of trade-marks is the law's recogni-
tion of the psychological function of symbols... . A trade-mark is a merchandising short-
cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe
he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort
to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial sym-
bol. NWhatever the means employed, the aim is the same--to convey through the mark,
in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it
appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has something of value. If another
poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created, the owner can ob-
tain legal redress." Id. at 205.
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THE PATENT CASES
In the patent field during the past ten years, the Supreme Court has
invalidated approximately twenty important patents dominating portions
of industries as diverse as the motion picture, telegraph, radio, chemical,
and machinery fields.' The patents involved in practically all of these
cases had been accepted as valid for varying periods of as much as forty
years by many patent lawyers and those utilizing the devices or processes,
and had thus achieved a large degree of commercial success.' In prac-
tically all of these cases, moreover, the Supreme Court reversed rulings
of the various circuit courts of appeals sustaining the validity of the pat-
ents involved.
The opinions of the Supreme Court in these cases discuss at length the
historical background and the technical features of the devices and pro-
cesses in question. In each case the conclusion is reached that prior antici-
pation or lack of "invention" or failure to comply as a matter of fact
with the statutory requirements dealing with patent applications renders
the patent invalid. 'Sometimes within one case all three of these conclu-
sions, or a combination of them, have been made the basis of the Court's
ruling as to invalidity.
7. Universal Oil Products Co. v. Globe Oil Refining Co., 12 U. S. L. WEEK 4424 (U. S,
1944); Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States, 320 U. S. 1 (1943); United
Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U. S. 228 (1942) ; Muncie Gear Works v. Outboard
Marine & Mfg. Co., 315 U. S. 759 (1942) ; U. S. Industrial Chemicals, Inc. v. Carbide
and Carbon Chemicals Corp., 315 U.- S. 668 (1942) ; Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic
Devices Corp., 314 U. S. 84 (1*941) ; Detrola Radio & Television Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp.,
313 U. S. 259 (1941) ; Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U. S. 211 (1940) ;
Toledo Pressed Steel Co. v. Standard Parts, Inc., 307 U. S. 350 (1939) ; Electric Storage
Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U. S. 5 (1939) ; Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio
Corporation of America, 306 U. S. 86 (1939); General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance
Corp., 304 U. S. 364 (1938) ; Lincoln Engineering Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U. S.
545 (1938) ; Textile Machine Works v. Louis Hirsch Textile Machines, Inc., 302 U. S,
490 (1938) ;Mantle Lamp Co. v. Aluminum Products Co., 301 U. S. 544 (1937) ; Smith
v. Hall, 301 U. S. 216 (1937) ; Essex Razor Blade Corp. v. Gillette Safety Razor Co,,
299 U. S. 94 (1936); Bassick Mfg. Co. v. Hollingshead Co., 298 U. S. 415 (1936);
Altoona Publix Theatres v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U. S. 477 (1935); Para-
mount Publix Corp. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U. S. 464 (1935). Compare the
two cases in which the Court has sustained infringement claims: Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co., Inc. v. Ray-O-Vac, 320 U. S. 727 (1944); Williams Manufacturing Co. v. United
Shoe Machinery Co., 316 U. S. 364 (1942). The Supreme Court's decision in Atlas Gas
Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 12 U. S. L. WEEK 4388 (U. S. 1944), offers further corrobora-
tion of the views expressed in this article. The Court by a divided vote of five to four held
that a circuit court of appeals properly reopened a case decided a decade before and set
aside a judgment of patent infringement based on false testimony.
8. See, e.g., the patents involved in the cases of Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v.
United States, 320 U. S. 1(1943); Essex Razor Blade Corp. v. Gillette Safety Razor Co,,
299 U. S. 94 (1936); Paramount Publix Corp. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U. S.
464 (1935).
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Most of the opinions in these cases do not discuss the fundamental pol-
icy considerations which have influenced the Court to embark upon the
detailed factual examination of the nature of the devices in suit or their
historical background. Thus the opinions of the Court in the *lfarconi
case, where some of the famous pioneer Marconi Patents were held in-
valid by a majority of the Court on the ground of prior anticipation
and lack of invention, contain nothing but a careful scrutiny of the nature
of the patents and of prior developments within the field.
Yet in a number of the cases the Court's opinions do indicate the ex-
planation for the invalidation of patents at an ever-accelerating tempo.
In these opinions the view is most emphatically asserted that the public
interest is the primary one to be considered in patent suits and that this
interest is best served by having an economy as freely competitive as pus-
sible, rather than one dominated by monopolies of the character repre-
sented by patents. As Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for a unanimous
Court, declared in the case of Muncie Gear Works s,. Outboard Marine &
Mfanufacturing Company :9
"To sustain the claims in question . . would require a plain
disregard of the pfiblic interest sought to be safeguarded by the pat-
ent statutes, and so frequently present but so seldom adequately rep-
resented in patent litigation." 1o
Mr. Justice Jackson, in another decision " invalidating a patent for lack
of invention and reversing a circuit court of appeals for a contrary deci-
sion, emphasized that a strict application of the requirement of invention
was necessary:
". . . lest in the constant demand for new appliances the heavy
hand of tribute be laid on each slight technological advance in an
art. '. . . indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather
to obstruct than to stimulate invention. It creates a class of specu-
lative schemers who make it their business to watch the advancing
wave of improvement, and gather its foam in the form of patented
monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavyw tax upon the industry
of the country, without contributing anything to the real advancement
of the arts. It embarrasses the honest pursuit of business with fears
and apprehensions of concealed liens and unknown liabilities to law-
suits and vexatious accountings for profits made in good faith.'" 1^
The host of Supreme Court decisions invalidating patents and revers-
ing the various circuit courts of appeals, has naturally had great impact
9. 315 U. S. 759 (1942).
10. Id. at 768.
11. Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U. S. 84 (1941). Chief
Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result in a separate Upinihn.
which likewise emphasized the lack of invention in the patent in suit. Id. at 92.
12. Id. at 92.
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upon the lower federal courts as well as upon the business community.
One result has been a flood of patent litigation in the federal courts. In
the year 1943 alone, the various circuit courts of appeals in thirty-four
cases ruled the patent claims involved to be entirely invalid for lack of
invention or prior anticipation, 3 or found no infringement. In the eight
cases where the Supreme Court was petitioned to review these decisions,
certiorari was denied. 14 In the same year, only three circuit court of ap-
13. Gasifier Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 138 F. (2d) 197 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943) ;
McIlvaine Patent Corp. v. Walgreen Co., 138 F. (2d) 177 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943); Leish-
man v. Associated Wholesale Elect. Co., 137 F. (2d) 722 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943), cert. de-
nied, 320 U. S. 794 (1943) ; Kalich v. Paterson Pacific Parchment Co., 137 F. (2d) 649
(C. C. A. 9th, 1943); Continental Machines v. Grob, 137 F. (2d) 470 (C. C. A. 8th,
1943) ; International Steel Wool Corp. v. Williams Co., 137 F. (2d) 342 (C. C. A. 6th,
1943); Abbott Machine Co. v. Universal Winding Co., 137 F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. 1st,
1943); Monogram Mfg. Co: v. Glemby Co., 136 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), ecerl.
denied, 320 U. S. 778 (1943) ; American Anode v. Lee-Tex Rubber Products Corp., 136
F. (2d) 581 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943); Fernandez v. Phillips, 136 F. (2d) 404 (C. C. A. 9th,
1943); Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Foundation, 136 F. (2d) 318
(C. C. A. 9th, 1943); Engineering Specialties Co. v. Burgess Battery Co., 136 F. (2d)
287 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943); Warner Bros. Co. v. American Lady Corset Co., 136 F. (2d)
93 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943) ; General Time Investments Corp. v. New Haven Clock Co., 136
F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943) ; Trabon Engineering Corp. v. Dirkes, 136 F. (2d) 24
'(C. C. A. 6th, 1943); Mead Johnson & Co. v. Hillman's, Inc., 135 F. (2d) 955 (C. C. A,
7th, 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 752 (1943) ; Chandler v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 135 F.
(2d) 885 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943) ; J. I. Case Co. v. Gleaner Harvester Corp., 135 F. (2d)
553 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943); Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America,
135 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 744 (1943); Pfanstiehl
Chemical Co. v. American Platinum Works, 135 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943) ; Seiber-
ling Rubber Co. v. I. T. S. Co., 134 F. (2d) 871 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943), cert. denied, 320
U. S. 747 (1943) ; Pleet-O-Lite Corp. v. Pleatex Corp., 134 F. (2d) 724 (C. C. A. 7th,
1943); Grayson Heat Control, Ltd. v. Los Angeles Gas Appliance Co., 134 F. (2d) 478
(C. C. A. 9th, 1943); Hastings Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Parts Corp., 134 F. (2d) 404
(C. C. A. 6th, 1943); Weston Electrical Instrument Corp. v. Dejur Amsco Corp., 133
F. (2d) 778 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943); Wallace v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 133 F. (2d) 763
(C. C. A. 2d, 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 739 (1943) ; Wilson v. Byron Jackson Co.,
133 F. (2d) 644 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943) ; Detachable Bit Co. v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.,
133 F. (2d) 632 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943) ; Kugelman v. Sketchley, 133 F. (2d) 426 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1943) ; Madsen Iron Works v. Wood, 133 F. (2d) 416 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943) ; Zan-
gerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F. (2d) 266 (C. C. A.
7th, 1943) ; Electro Mfg. Co. v. Yellin, 132 F. (2d) 979 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943); Sylvania
Industrial Corp. v. Visking Corp., 132 F. (2d) 947 (C., C. A. 4th, 1943), dismissed on n1o-
tion of petitioner, 319 U. S. 777 (1943) ; Ajax Hand Brake Co. v. Superior Hand Brake
Co., 132 F. (2d) 606 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943).
14. Leishman v. Associated Wholesale Elect. Co., 137 F. (2d) 722 (C. C. A. 9th,
1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 794 (.1943) ; Monogram Mfg. Co. v. Glemby Co., 136 F. (2d)
961 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 778 (1943) ; Mead Johnson & Co. v. Hill-
man's, Inc., 135 F. (2d) 955 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 752 (1943) ; Libbey-
Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America, 135 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943),
cert. denied, 320 U. S. 744 (1943) ; Seiberling Rubber Co. v. I. T. S. Co., 134 F. (2d) 871
(C. C. A. 6th, 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 747 (1943); Wallace v. F. W. Woolworth
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peals decisions sustained patent claims and found them to be infringed,1"
and these three involved very narrow claims. In only one of them was
certiorari sought and denied,1" the petition in a second being dismissed
upon stipulation of counsel."
PATENT CLAIMS IN RELATION TO ANTI-TRUST Ltws
An even clearer exposition of basic policy considerations which have
induced the present Supreme Court to adopt a restrictive attitude toward
patent claims, may be found in a body of recent cases where the inter-
relation between patent claims and the anti-trust laws has been e-x-plored.
In these cases, patent infringement suits, defendants have sought immu-
nity from liability upon the ground that the plaintiff attempted to use
the patent to eliminate competition in products not directly within its
scope. Such a course of conduct, the defendants contended, violated the
policy of the anti-trust laws and the plaintiff, even if his patent were
valid, should be estopped from maintaining suits for its infringement.
Although these contentions were rejected by a number of the circuit
courts of appeals, they were approved and accepted by the Supreme
Court."8
Thus, in the case of Morton Salt Company -,. G. S. Suppiger Com-
pany, 9 the Supreme Court reversed a circuit court of appeals decision
Co., 133 F. (2d) 763 (C. C A. 2d, 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 739 (1943); Cover v.
Schwartz, 133 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942), cert denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943) ; Cridel-
baugh v. Rudolph, 131 F. 795 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942), cert. denied, 313 U. S. 779 (1943).
15. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Refining, Inc., 135 F. (2d) 900 (C. C. A. 4th,
1943); C. Howard Hunt Pen Co. v. Radiant Point Pen Corp., 135 F. (2d) 370 (C. C. A.
2d, 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 773 (1943) ; Petersime Incubator Co. v. Bundy Incuba-
tor Co., 135 F. (2d) 580 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943), dismissed on motion of Petitioner, 320 U.
S. 805 (1943).
16. C. Howard Hunt Pen Co. v. Radiant Point Pen Corp., 135 F. (2d) 870 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 773 (1943).
17. PetersimelIncubator Co. v. Bundy Incubator Co.. 135 F. (2d) 590 (C. C. A. 6th,
1943), dismissed on motion of petitioner, 320 U. S. 805 (1943). Likewise, during the first
half of the present year a large number of patents have been declared invalid by the federal
courts. See, e.g., International Carrier-Call & Television Corp. v. Radio Corporation of
America, 61 U. S. Pat. Q. 392 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) ; Danforth v. Northill Co., 61 Pat. Q.
206 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944); Cornell, Jr. v. Chase Bros. Brass & Copper Co., 61 U. S. Pat. Q.
195 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); Derman v. Stor-Aid, Inc., 141 F. (2d) 580 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) ;
Palerno v. Surrette Storage Battery Co., 61 U. S. Pat. Q. 401 (D. Mass. 1944).
18. Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U. S. 6.0 (1944) ;
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investing Co., 320 U. S. 661 (1944); Sola Electric Co.
v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U. S. 173 (1942); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316
U. S. 265 (1942) ; United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U. S. 241 (1942) ; B. B. Chemi-
cal Co. v. Ellis, 314 U. S. 495 (1942) ; Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U. S.
488 (1942) ; Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S. 436 (1940); International
Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 29S U. S. 131 (1936).
19. 314 U. S. 488 (1942).
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which had granted an injunction against infringement of a patent. The
Court sustained the defense that since the plaintiff was making use of its
patent to restrain the sale of an unpatented article used in conjunction
with its patented machine, the plaintiff was guilty of unclean hands and
could not maintain a suit for infringement. Chief Justice Stone, writing
for a unanimous Court, declared that as a court of equity it would not
".. . lend its aid to protect the patent monopoly when respondent
is using it as the effective means of restraining competition with its
sale of an unpatented article." 20
Placing the Court's decision squarely upon the public policy of encour-
aging competition rather than monopoly, he added:
"Where the patent is used as a means of restraining competition with
the patentee's sale of'an unpatented product, the successful prosecu-
tion of an infringement suit even against one who is not a competitor
in such sale is a powerful aid to the maintenance of the attempted
monopoly of the unpatented article, and is thus a contributing factor
in thwarting the public policy underlying the grant of the patent ...
"It is the adverse effect upon the public interest of a successful in-
fringement suit, in conjunction with the patentee's course of conduct,
which disqualifies him to maintain the suit, regardless of whether the
particular defendant has suffered from the misuse of the patent." 21
Likewise, in United States v. Masonite Corporation,22 the Court re-
versed a district court decree dismissing a suit by the United States to
enjoin alleged violations of the federal anti-trust acts. The defendants
were competitors, involved in disputes 'over the validity of certain patents.
In order to end their differences, they had entered into a series of agree-
ments by which all of them recognized the validity of these patents and
accepted licenses from one of their number to handle the product in
question through a system of del credere agencies. These agreements con-
tained provisions fixing the resale prices at which the defendants would
sell the product involved. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the
patents could not be'used to sustain the validity of the agreements, an
integral part of which was the resale price-fixing arrangement, declaring:
20. Id. at 490.
21. Id. at 493-94.
22. 316 U. S. 265 (1942). In another case decided the same day, United States v.
Univis Lens Co., 316 U. S. 241 (1942), the Court held that the holder of a patent may
not fix resale prices of the patented article for his licensees, even though the latte" re-
ceive from the owner an incomplete article and must finish it in accordance with the
learning of the patent. Chief Justice Stone, in a unanimous opinion, bluntly declared:
"Agreements for price maintenance of articles moving in interstate commerce are, with-
out more, unreasonable restraints within the meaning of the Sherman Act because they
eliminate competition, United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392; United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150." Id. at 252.
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"Since patents are privileges restrictive of a free economy, the rights
which Congress has attached to them must be strictly construed so
as not to derogate from the general law beyond the necessary re-
quirements of the patent statute. . . . Active and vigorous competi-
tion then tends to be impaired, not from any preference of the public
for the patented product, but from the preference of the competitors
for a mutual arrangement for price fixing which promises more profit
if the parties abandon rather than maintain competition. . . . Con-
trol over prices thus becomes an actual or potential brake on compe-
tition. This kind of marketing device thus, actually or potentially,
throttles or suppresses competing and non-infringing products and
tends to place a premium on the abandonment of competition. It is
outside our competence to inquire whether the result was or was not
beneficent, or whether the evil was or was not realized." 2
Recently, the Court has carried these doctrines to even more precedent-
shattering conclusions. In Mercoid Corporation v. Mid-Continent Invest-
ing Company,24 it held that a patentee could not maintain a suit for con-
tributory infringement against the seller of an unpatented device, admit-
tedly designed solely for use in, and constituting an important element of,
the patented combination article. The owner under an arrangement with
its exclusive licensee had conditioned the sale of the patented combination
upon sales by the latter of the unpatented device, which both its licensee
and the defendant were selling. The alleged contributory infringer set
up as defense that the patent owner was barred from maintaining this
suit for contributory infringement because its arrangements with respect
to the unpatented article in question were violative of the anti-trust laws.
In reversing the circuit court, which had sustained the charge of con-
tributory infringement, the majority overruled the Supreme Court's
prior ruling in the case of Leeds & Catlin Company v. Victor Talking Ma-
chine Company, 2 5 a leading decision on contributory infringement. The
Court held that a patent owner could not restrain the manufacture of an
unpatented article, although designed solely for and intended to be used as
part of a product covered by a combination patent. To sustain a patent
owner's right to injunctive relief against a defendant's sale of the unpat-
tented article would, in the opinion of at least a majority G of the Court,
23. Id. at 280-81.
24. 320 U. S. 661 (1944).
25. 213 U. S. 325 (1909).
26. Four Justices (Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter, and Jackson) dissented, primarily
upon the ground that the defenses that the actions of the licensee and owner were violative
of the anti-trust laws could have been raised in a prior suit to which the defendant was
privy, and hence, were barred by res judicata. The extent to which the majority dis-
allowed this defense of res judicata may be seen from that portion of the majority opinion
dealing with the question:
"Respondents ask the equity court for an injunction against infringement by petitioner
of the patent in question and for an accounting. Should such a decree be entered, the
1944]
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have been to carve an exception to the policy expressed in the anti-trust
laws. The underlying policy which, it is believed, is the basis of decision
in not only these, but also the preceding patent cases discussed was suc-
cinctly stated by Mr. Justice Douglas:
"The grant of a patent is the grant of a special privilege 'to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' . . . It carries, of course,
a right to be free from competition in the practice of the invention.
But the limits of the patent are narrowly and strictly confined to the
precise terms of the grant. .... It is the public interest which is domi-
nant in the patent system .... It is the protection of the public in a
Court would be placing its imprimatur on a scheme which involves a misuse of the patent
privilege and a violation of the anti-trust laws. It would aid in the consummation of a
conspiracy to expand a patent beyond its legitimate scope. But patentees and licensees
cannot secure aid from the Court to bring such an event to pass, 'unless it is in accord-
ance with policy to grant that help.' Beasley v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 191 U. S. 492,
497. And the determination of that policy is not 'at the mercy' of the parties (id., p. 498)
nor dependent on the usual rules governing the settlement of private litigation ...
'Where an important public interest would be prejudiced,' the reasons for denying injunc-
tive relief 'may be compelling.' Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Co., 289 U. S. 334, 338.
And see United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 194. That is the principle which has
led this Court in the past to withhold aid from a patentee in suits for either direct or
indirect infringement where the patent was being misused. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Sup-
piger Co., .... [314 U. S. 488]. That principle is controlling here. The parties cannot
foreclose the courts from the exercise of that discretion by the failure to interpose the
same defense in an earlier litigation. Cf. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317
U. S. 173." Id. at 670.
Messrs. Justices Roberts and Frankfurter, in their respective dissenting opinions, also
indicated disagreement with the views of the majority on the question of contributory
infringement, but took the view that it was not necessary to decide these questions.
In the companion case of Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,
320 U. S. 680 (1944), the Supreme Court unanimously held that the rule of the 11forton
Salt case barred the exclusive licensee of the patentee party plaintiff in the companion
case from maintaining a suit for contributory infringement, and held also that the de-
fendant was entitled to injunctive relief against the exclusive licensee's threatening it or its
customers with patent infringement suits. Four Justices concurred in result on the authority
of the Morton Salt case. The relation between the Mercoid case and the prior law on the
subject of contributory infringement is succinctly summarized in the recent case, Landis
Machine Co. v. Chase Tool Co., 61 U. S. Pat. Q. 164, 166 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944): "In Mer-
coid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.... the rule of Carbice Corp. v. American Pat-
ents Corp., 283 U. S. 27, - . . wherein it had been held that the use of a patent for a machine
or process to secure a partial monopoly in supplies consumed in operation or in unpatented
materials employed in it, barred recovery for infringement was extended to cover unpat-
ented material or devices which are themselves an integral part of the structure embodying
the patent. The result of the decision, it was said, 'is to limit substantially the doctrine of
contributory infringement.' A careful study of the opinion, together with its interpretation
liy the dissenting Justices, and a consideration of the doubt implicit in the observation 'what
residuum may be left we need not stop to consider' leads to the conclusion that nothing has
been left of the doctrine as formerly it had been applied to the furnishing of unpatented parts
integral to structures embodying patented combinations."
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system of free enterprise which alike nullifies a patent wlherc any part
of it is invalid . . . and denies to the patentee after issuance the
power to use it in such a way as to acquire a monopoly which is not
plainly within the terms of the grant .... ," 27
Naturally, the refusal of the Supreme Court to permit the maintenance
of patent infringement suits where patents have been used in a manner
violative of the policy of the anti-trust laws, has been reflected in the rul-
ings of the various circuit courts of appeals.28
ANTI-TRUST ACTIONS
In a number of recent cases, the Supreme Court had dealt with situa-
tions where the application of the Anti-Trust Acts-Sherman and Clay-
ton-was directly involved.2 These decisions, even more strongly than
those which dealt with the relation between the patent and anti-trust laws,
reflect the present Supreme Court's determination to outlaw all agree-
ments and arrangements affecting interstate commerce which it believes
will have the effect of eliminating or impeding competition.
Thus in the Interstate Circuit case,3 the Court served clear notice that
the anti-trust laws and the policies represented therein would be broadly
applied to the distribution phases of the niotion picture industry." Re-
27. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investing Co., 320 U. S. 661, 665-6 (1944).
28. See, e.g., Landis Machinery Co. Y. Chaso Tool Co., C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv.
fl 57228 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944) ; Cummer-Graham Co. v. Straightside Basket Corp., 61 U. S.
Pat. Q. 395 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944) ; National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137
F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943); Barber-Colman Co. v. National Tool Co., 136 F. (2d)
339 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943) ; see also the learned opinion of Judge Leahy in United States v.
Vehicular Parking Co., 61 U. S. Pat. Q. 105 (D. Del. 1944).
29. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U. S. 519 (1943); Fashion Orig-
inators Guild v. Federal Trade Comm., 312 U. S. 457 (1941); C. E. Stevens Co. v. Fos-
ter & Kleiser Co., 311 U. S. 265 (1940); United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U. S. 150 (1940) ; Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U. S. 203 (1939) ; Sugar
Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U. S. 553 (1936). The decision of the Supreme Court
in United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 320 U. S. 711 (1944), offers additional
confirmation of the article's analysis of the trend in the anti-trust field, Vhile affirming
by an evenly divided Court (four to four) dismissal of charges against the Bausch & Lomb
Company, the Court sustained the sweeping findings and provisions of the lower court's
decree against the Soft-Lite Company.
30. Ifiterstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U. S. 203 (1939).
31. For a study of the various divisions of the motion picture industry as patterns
of monopoly, see BERTRAND, TNEC R.s., MoTio. Pxcrum INDusTRm-A P&rnu oF
CONTROL, Monograph 34 (1936) 43. See also an excellent Note, The Motion Picture Indtrs-
try and The Anti-Trust Laws (1936) 36 CoL. L Rnv. 635. Similar notice has been served
on insurance companies. In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 12
U. S. L. WEEK 4451 (U. S. 1944), the Court by a four-three decision overturned long-
established precedent to hold the business of insurance a part of interstate commerce sub-
ject to the application of the Sherman Act.
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jecting the argument that the copyright law protected practices that serve
to eliminate competition-as it rejected in the allied field of patents the
widely held notion that patents serve a similar function-the majority of
the Court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Stone held:
"An agreement illegal because it suppresses competition is not any
less so because the competitive article is copyrighted. The fact that
the restraint is made easier or more effective by making the copyright
subservient to the contract does not relieve it of illegality." 32
Nor has the Court permitted the elimination of admitted evils within
industries to constitute justification for the pursuance of policies which
it deemed inimical to the system of free competition. In the Socony
Vacuum Oil Company case,3 3 a majority of the Court reversed a circuit
court of appeals decision, which in turn had reversed a criminal convic-
"tion in a district court against the major oil companies of the country for
conspiracy to violate the anti-trust laws through a concerted program
of buying oil in the mid-western part of the country. The defendant
companies had argued that their conduct was induced and justified by
their desire to eliminate distressed gasoline, which in that area was un-
reasonably depressing market, prices and demoralizing the industry. The
Court flatly rejected this argument and, finding that the defendants' buy-
ing program was one that would affect the price structure in the market
concerned, held the defendants' conduct to be illegal per se. The Court
refused to be drawn into the question of the reasonableness of the prices
that resulted from the defendants' conduct, or whether the competitive
abuses would justify conduct affecting the price structure, declaring that
if it permitted itself to become enmeshed in these questions, the philoso-
phy of the anti-trust acts "would be supplanted by one which is wholly
alien to a system of free competition." 14 Mr. Justice Douglas emphasized
that:
"Those who fixed reasonable prices today would perpetuate unrea-
sonable prices tomorrow, since those prices would not be subject to
continuous administrative supervision and readjustment in light of
changed conditions. Those who controlled the prices would control
or effectively dominate the market. And those who were in that
strategic position would have it in their power to destroy or drasti-
cally impair the competitive system. . . . Any combination which
tampers with price structure is engaged in an unlawful activ-
ity." 85
32. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U. S. 208, 230 (1939).
33. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940).
34. Id. at 221.
35. Ibid.
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Likewise, the Court has refused to permit a chaotic situation in
the garment industry to constitute a justification for an arrangement
whereby garment and textile manufacturers agreed not to sell their pro-
duct except on condition that the buyers agree not to use or deal in
textiles or garments copied from the designs of respective manufactur-
ers. The Federal Trade Commission found that this program, carried
out through a Fashion Originators Guild, was an unfair method of com-
petition because violative of the policy of the anti-trust acts and issued
an order enjoining them from carrying out such a program. In sustain-
ing a circuit court decision upholding the Federal Trade Commission's
action and rejecting the views of another circuit court of appeals which
had found in a private anti-trust action that the practices involved were
not illegal,36 the Court said that the course of conduct pursued was illegal
even though the Guild did not fix or regulate prices or limit production
in any way. The Court unanimously rejected the argument that, since
the defendant's conduct was allegedly necessary to protect the manufac-
turer, laborer, retailer, and consumer from the evils resulting from the
pirating of original design, the defendant's conduct did not constitute an
unlawful method of competition. Indeed, tie Court sustained the refusal
of the Federal Trade Commission to hear much' of the evidence offered
in support of this defense, remarking:
".. . the aim of petitioner's combination was the intentional destruc-
tion of one type of manufacture and sale which competed with Guild
members. The purpose and object of this combination, its potential
power, its tendency to monopoly, tie coercion it could and did prac-
tice upon a rival method of competition, all brought it within the pol-
icy of the prohibition declared by the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
. . . Under these circumstances it was not error to refuse to hear
the evidence offered, for the reasonableness of the methods pursued
by the combination to accomplish its unlawful object is no more ma-
terial than would be the reasonableness of the prices fixed by unlawful
combination." 
3 7
In support of its conduct, the Fashion Guild had urged that the prac-
tices of style pirating, engaged in by the members of the industry against
whom their program was directed, constituted unfair methods of compe-
tition and relied upon the broad doctrines as to the scope of protection
against pirating enunciated in International News Service v. Associated
Press.38 The present Court refused, however, to allow those doctrines
of unfair competition to legalize the petitioner's combination, which it
36. William Filene's Sons Co. v. Fashion Originators' Guild, 90 F. (2d) 556 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1937).
37. Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm., 312 U. S. 457, 467 (1941).
38. 248 U. S. 215 (1918).
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found regulated and restrained interstate commerce in violation of the
policies of the anti-trust laws.3 '
As might be expected, these Supreme Court decisions have exercised
great influence over the decisions of lower federal courts. These tribun-
als, in express reliance upon the Supreme Court cases considered in this
section, have within the past few years rendered a series of decisions
giving the anti-trust acts a broad interpretation and enlarging their sphere
of application.40 While within the field of trademark and unfair compe-
tition litigation, to be now considered, the circuit courts themselves have
formulated the legal standards which exemplify the trend, these stan-
dards also reflect the influence of the Supreme Court's persistent reluc-
tance to sanction monopoly and its emphasis upon the maintenance of a
competitive economy.
TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION SUITS
The importance in an advertising-conscious economy of the use of
marks or symbols as a means of identifying the origin of goods needs no
reiteration.41 Phenomenal exploitation of such marks or symbols through
modern advertising techniques enhances the importance and significance
of the legal framework which defines the relative rights of: (1) those
utilizing particular marks or symbols; (2) those manufacturing or mer-
chandising similar goods in connection with which they use marks or
symbols; (3) the producers, distributors, or retailers of dissimilar goods in
connection with which marks or symbols are used; (4) the consuming
public; and (5) society as a totality. Because the interests and objectives
39. As Mr. Justice Black remarked: "Nor can the unlawful combination be justified
upon the argument that systematic copying of dress designs is itself tortious, or should
now be declared so by us. In the first place, whether or not given conduct is tortious ig
a question of state law, under our decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64. In
the.second place, even if copying were an acknowledged tort under the law of every state,
that situation would not justify petitioners in combining together to regulate and restrain
interstate commerce in violation of federal law. And for these same reasons, the prin-
ciples declared in International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, cannot
serve to legalize petitioners' unlawful combination." Fashion Originators' Guild v. Fed-
eral Trade Comm., 312 U. S. 457, 468 (1941).
40. See, e.g., Montrose Lumber Co. v. United States, 124 F. (2d) 573 (C. C. A.
10th, 1941); Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Johnson, 123 F. (2d) 1016 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941);
United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F. (2d) 376 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941); United
States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123 (3 Judge Fed. Expediting Ct., 1943) ; and see also
the opinion of the court on the settlement of the decree in this litigation, C. C. . Trade
Reg. Serv. f 53,025 (Feb. 2, 1944).
41. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter recently remarked in Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen
Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U. S. 203, 205 (1942) : "If it is true that we live by
symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them." See the discussion of this
case supra note 6.
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of those within each of these categories are patently diverse, the cases
within this field involve a resolution of conflicting claims. The emphasis
placed upon the relative interests varies with changes in the political, eco-
nomic, and social doctrines dominating judicial thinking; and mobility
in the legal pattern is aided by the dynamism of common law judicial
processes, which for the most part mold this field of law.
During the past decade, the results reached by the courts reflect an
ever greater emphasis upon (a) the.interests of the consuming public and
those of society at large, and (b) the view that the interests of these two
overlapping groups are best served by the fostering of as competitive an
economy as possible. Consequently, there has been a curtailment of the
relative rights of those within the first category above in contests with
those within the second and third categories. It is suggested that decision-
al trends have not been influenced by writers like Callman because, in their
advocacy of greater recognition of exclusive rights in marks and busi-
ness methods,42 they have overlooked the interests of the public, and the
view that free competition best advances those interests.
For purposes of convenience, the recent cases in this field may be
divided into three general categories: (a) those involving the use by
competitors of marks-whether words or symbols--on similar goods;
(b) those involving the use by plaintiff and defendant of similar marks
on different goods; and (c) those involving claims with respect to unpat-
ented or uncopyrighted business methods, systems, or ideas.
(A) The Use by Competitors of Marks, Whether Words or Sym-
bols, on Similar Goods. The word "mark," is used in this article to mean
any word or symbol which is employed to identify the origin of the goods
in connection with which it is utilized. The term "trademark" is pregnant
with difficulty because it often connotes legal conclusions that courts have
drawn with respect to the particular mark in issue. Thus use of the word
"mark" avoids the necessity for distinguishing betAveen technical trade-
mark suits and unfair competition actions where merely the use of such
marks or words or symbols is involved.
The only Supreme Court decision during the past decade on the relative
scope of rights with respect to the use of particular marks is the famous
Shredded Wheat case. 3  The issue presented was whether the National
42. See, e.g., Callman, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sodon: Unjust EtrIch-
ment in the Law of Unfair Competition (1942) 55 H.L&v. L. Rnv. 595.
43. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111 (1938). Discussion of the
relation between the expiration of the patent as it originally existed with respect to the
process for making the cereal and the right to use the words in question is omitted here
because it is not believed that that was a dominating factor in the decision. See Deren-
berg, "Shredded WVheat"--The Still-born Trade-mar: (1939) 16 N. Y. U. L Q. RE%. 376.
Those aspects of the case which dealt with the right of defendant to sell its product in
the same pillow-shaped form as the plaintiff's product .as sold are discussed in ra page
548.
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Biscuit Company, which had built up, together with its predecessors, a
large market for a cereal sold under the mark "Shredded Wheat," could
enjoin another large cereal manufacturing company from using the
words "Shredded Wheat" as the name of its product. Admittedly, the
defendant competitor had begun to use the mark in question after the
plaintiff had spent a large sum of money over a period of years in adver-
tising and distributing its product under the name "Shredded Wheat."
The circuit court had issued a decree enjoining the National Biscuit Com-
pany's competitor from using the mark "Shredded Wheat" as the name,
or as part of the name, of its product. Reversing this decision the Su-
preme Court held: (1) that because-as it found-the name "Shredded
Wheat" was descriptive and known to the public as the name of the
product involved, any trader had the right to use the words "Shredded
Wheat" as the name of that product; (2) that the National Biscuit Com-
pany had not built up sufficiently a secondary meaning for the mark
"Shredded Wheat" to establish that the words had come to mean during
the years a product of a particular manufacturer rather than the product
iiself.
44
It is significant that the Court's opinion was written by the late Mr.
Justice Brandeis, whose advocacy of a free and competitive economy as
the solution of our economic ills, had characterized his writings and dis-
senting opinions for many years.45 The doctrinal importanqe of the
decision lies not only in its insistence upon the rights of traders with
respect to generic names and the strict test which it has laid down with
respect to the proof required to establish a secondary meaning, but like-
wise in its ruling that competitors are entitled to share a market for a
product even though created by another company:
"Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of the arti-
cle known as 'Shredded Wheat'; and thus is sharing in a market
44. "As Kellogg Company [the defendant] had the right to make the article, it had,
also, the right to use the term by which the public knows it. [citing cases]." Kellogg Co.
v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111, 116-17 (1938).
"There is no basis here for applying the doctrine of secondary meaning. The evidence
shows only that due to the long period in which the plaintiff or its predecessor was the
only manufacturer of the product, many people have come to associate the product, and
as a consequence the name by which the product is generally known, with the plaintiff's
factory at Niagara Falls. But to establish a trade name in the term 'shredded wheat' the
plaintiff must show more than a subordinate meaning which applies to it. It must show
that the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the
product but the producer." Id. at 118. (Italics added).
45. For a collection of Brandeis' writings in which are presented hi views upon
monopoly and competition in relation to the ills of our times, see LIE., TuE BRANDiIS
GUIDE TO THE MonERN WORLD (1941) 54-64; and RIcBiERG, The Industrial Liberalism
of Mr. Justice Brandeis in MR. JUsTicE BRANDEIS (Frankfurter ed. 1932) 127. Mr. Jus-
tice Brandeis' famous dissent in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 541-80 (1933), contains
a full discussion of his views on this subject. It is significant to note that Mr. Justice Stone
(now Chief Justice) concurred in this famous dissent.,
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which was created by the skill and judgment of plaintiff's predecessor
and has been widely extended by vast expenditures in advertising
persistently made. But that is not unfair." 40
This language serves to emphasize the Court's concern in deciding liti-
gations of this character with the public interest and its judgment that
it is best served by as extensively a competitive economy as possible.
The trend of decisions within this field during the past decade-in
contrast to that which prevailed in the preceding period 4 ---- has unmis-
takably been moving towards restricting the scope of exclusive rights
awarded plaintiffs and correspondingly broadening the privileges of their
competitors. The influence 48 of the Shredded fi heat " case, plus the
effect of the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari " in a large number
of cases where the results reached by the circuit courts were in harmony
with the Court's views on the central problem of monopoly versus com-
petition have served to mold and accelerate this trend. With increasing con-
sistency the circuit courts have rendered judgments for defendants, revers-
ing district courts' rulings awarding relief to plaintiffs,,; and restricting
46. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111, 122 (1933).
47. For a treatment of these earlier trends, see Handler and Pickett, supra note 3.
48. See, e.g., Grosjean v. Panther-Panco Rubber Co., 113 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A.
1st, 1940), discussed infra note 51.
49. For a discussion of two other Supreme Court eases dealing with trademark ques-
tions, not treated here, see note 6 supra. For a discussion of the effect wvhich the Shrcddcd
Vheat case has had in cases dealing with unfair competition claims, see pages 546-48 and
tiote 95 infra.
50. See cases cited infra note 51.
51. Pennzoil Co. v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 140 F. (2d) 387 (C. C. A. 5th,
1944), aff'g per curiam 50 F. Supp. 891 (D. Md. 1943) (owner of the mark "Pennzoil" not
entitled to enjoin use of the mark "Greenzoil," both applied to petroleum products), cert. de-
nied, 12 U. S. L. Week 3397, (U. S. 1944); Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co.,
139 F. (2d) 98 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943) (owner of the mark "Taylor" not entitled to enjoin the
use of the marks "T" or "'Tay," defendant's marks being used on materials that could Le umed
with plaintiff's machine on which it used its mark 'Taylor"), cert. denied, 64 Sup. Ct. 732
(1944) ; Falstaff Brewing Co. v. Lemp Brewing Co., 139 F. (2d) 26 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943)
(owner of a mark consisting of a shield having an outline, which was asymmetrical, with a
deep-rounded knotch in upper right-hand portion, not entitled to enjoin use of a mart: con-
sisting of a shield which consisted of a symmetrical design-having two rounded Inotches on
each side, both marks used on containers of malt liquors) ; Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow -
Warren, Ltd., 137 F. (2d) 955 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943) (owner of the mark "Chateau Martin' not
entitled to enjoin use of the mark "Chateau Montay"), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 753 (1943) ;
American Photographic Pub. Co. v. Ziff-Davis Pub. Co., 135 F. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 7th,
1943) (owner of the mark "American Photography" held not entitled to enjoin ue of
the mark "Popular Photography," both marks used on magazine publications) ; So'lventol
Chemical Products v. Langfield, 134 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943) (owner of the mark
"Solvite" not entitled to enjoin use of the mark "Solventol;' both marks used on cleaning
fluids-defendant's counterclaim to compel registration of its mark over plaintiff's oppo-
sition likewise granted), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 743 (1943) ; Quaker Oats Co. v. General
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and casting doubt on their own decisions in the earlier decade." Exam-
ination of all the circuit court cases in this field reveals that the number
Mills Co., 134.F. (2d) 429 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943) (owner of the mark "Wheaties" not
entitled to enjoin use of the marks "Oaties" and "Quaker Oaties," both parties' .marks
applied to breakfast cereals); Cridlebaugh v. Rudolph, 131 F. (2d) 795 (C. C. A. 3d,
1942) (owner of the mark "Specs" not entitled to enjoin use of the mark "Goggles," even
assuming validity of plaintiff's mark, both marks used on protective devices for chickens),
cert. denied, 318 U. S. 779 (1943) ; Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fee & Stemwedel, Inc., 129
F. (2d) 156 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) (owner of the marks "Stormoguide," "Theremoguide,"
and "Humidiguide," not entitled to enjoin use of the mark "Airguide") ; James Heddon's
Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, 128 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942) (owner of
the mark "Head-On-Bassor" not entitled to enjoin use of the mark "Millsite Bassor,"
both marks applied to fishing tackle), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 674 (1942); Alexander
Young Distilling Co. v. National Distillers Products Corp., 127 F. (2d) 727 (C. C. A.
3d, 1942), aff'g per curiam 40 F. Supp. 748 (D. Pa. 1941) (owner of the mark "Y. P. M."
not entitled to enjoin use of the mark "PM," both marks used on whiskey) ; Rytex Co. v.
Ryan, 126 F. (2d) 952 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) (owner of the marks "Rytex" and "Rytex
Deckle Edge Vellum" not entitled to enjoin use of the marks "Rynart" and "Rynart
Deckle Edge Vellum"-the latter three words being admittedly descriptive-both marks
used on stationery) ; Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 122 F. (2d) 318 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1941) (owner of the mark "Pay Roll" not entitled to enjoin use of the mark
"Cash Roll," both marks used on candy wafers), rv'd on other grounds, 315 U. S, 666
(1942) (with directive to apply applicable state law) ; American Brake Shoe & Foundry
Co. v. Alltex Products Corp., 117 F. (2d) 983 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) (owner of the mark
"American Brakeblok" not entitled to relief against the use of the mark "National Brake
Block," even though court assumed a secondary meaning had been established by plaintiff
for the descriptive phrase "Brakeblok," and even though dealers were substituting defend-
ant's product for that of the plaintiff-court found that defendant's mark did not contribute
to this passing off), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 631 (1941) ; Dixi-Cola Laboratories v. Coca-
Cola Co., 117 F. (2d) 352 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941) (owner of the mark "Coca-Cola" held not
entitled to relief against the use of the mark "Dixi-Cola," both marks used on soft drinks),
cert. denied, 314 U. S. 629 (1941); Steem-Electric Corp. v. Herzfeld-Phillipson Co,
118 F. (2d) 122 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) (owner of mark "Steem-Electric" held not entitled
to enjoin use of the mark "Steam-O-Matic," both marks used 6n steam-electric irons);
McGraw-Hill Publishing Co. v. American Aviation Association, 117 F. (2d) 293 (App.
D. C. 1940) (owner of the mark "Aviation" held not entitled to relief against the use
of the mark "American Aviation," both marks used as names for magazine publica-
tions); Grosjean v. Panther-Panco Rubber Co., 113 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940)
(owner of the mark "Gro-Cord!' not entitled to enjoin use of the mark "Pancord," both
marks used on soles and heels) ;'Colburn v. Puritan Mills, Inc., 108 F. (2d) 377 (C. C. A.
7th, 1939) (owner of the mark "Py-Do" not entitled to relief against the use of the mark
"Py-O-My," both used for pie-dough products, even assuming validity of plaintiff's
mark) ; Glenmore Distilleries Co. v. National Distillers Products Corp., 101 F. (2d) 479
(C. C. A. 4th, 1939) (owner of the mark "Kentucky Tavern" not entitled to relief against
the use of the mark "Town Tavern," both marks used on whiskey, even though the Patent
Office had held defendant's mark confusingly similar), cert. deied, 307 U. S. 632 (1939);
John Morrell & Co. v. Doyle, 97 F. (2d) 232 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) (owner of the mark
"Strongheart" not entitled to relief against the use of the mark "Red Heart" together
with the picture of a dog, both marks used on dog foods, even though the Patent Office
had held defendant's mark confusingly similar to that of the plaintiff) ; Time, Inc. v. Ultem
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in favor of the defendants greatly preponderatesr 3 And in view of the
great importance to the consuming public and the con-mercial world of
Publications, 96 F. (2d) 164 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) (owner of the mark "Life" not entitled
to relief against use of the mark "Movie Life," both used on magazine publications) ; Pepsi-
Cola Co. v. Krause Bottling Co., 92 F. (2d) 272 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) (owner of the mart:
"Pepsi-Cola" not entitled to enjoin use of the mark "Pep," both used on beverages);
Warner Publications, Inc. v. Popular Publications, Inc., 87 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 2d,
1937) (owner of the mark "Ranch Romances" not entitled to use of the mark "Rangeland
Romances," both magazine publications, even assuming plaintiff had established a sec-
ondary meaning for its mark); Gold Dust Corp. v. Hoffenberg, 87 F. (2d) 451 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1937) (owner of the mark "Gold Dust" not entitled to enjoin use of the mart:
"Silver Dust"); Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85 F. (2d) 75 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1936) (plaintiff who coined the mark "Cellophane" and was original user not en-
titled to enjoin competitor from using the word "Cellophane" as the name of the same pro-
duct as plaintiff's upon the ground that the word "Cellophane" at the time of suit meant to
the public a particular product as distinguished from any particular source of that product),
cert. denied, 305 U. S. 672 (1938), 304 U. S. 575 (1938), 299 U. S. 601 (1936); Fav,-
cett Publications, Inc. v. Popular fechanics Co., 80 F. (2d) 194 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935)
(owner of the mark "Popular Magazines" not entitled to enjoin defendant from using
the mark "Modern Magazines," both marks used on magazine publications, although
plaintiff was assumed to have established a secondary meaning in the word "mechanics,"
the Patent Office had denied defendant's registration on the grounds of confusing simi-
larity, and there was considerable evidence of confusion). The most recent case is Selchow-
Righter Co. v. Western Printing & Lithographing Co., 61 U. S. Pat. Q. 470 (C. C. A. 7th,
1944) (owner of the mark 'Parcheesi" as applied to a game held not entitled to enjoin use of
the mark "Pachisi," found to be Hindu name for the gaine, although plaintiff's marl: vas
found to be validity registered under the ten year proviso of the 1905 Trademark Act).
Contrast with these cases those in which relief was granted to the plaintiff: Lone
Ranger, Inc., v. Cox, 124 F. (2d) 650 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942) (persons who established a
secondary meaning in connection with the tradename "Lone Ranger" held entitled to
enjoin the use of that mark-defendant, however, allowed to advertise that he vas the
man who played the part of "X" in the motion picture "Lone Ranger"-thus, very limited
injunction issued); Hemmeter Cigar Co. v. Congress Cigar Co., 118 F. (2d) 64 (C. C. A.
6th, 1941) (owner of the mark "Champ" held entitled to enjoin defendant's use of the
mark "Portina Champ," both marks used on cigars, but plaintiff's rights limited to three
states, where it had commenced business prior to defendant) ; Little Tavern Shops, Inc.
v. Davis, 116 F. (2d) 903 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941) (owner of the mark "Little Tavern" used
in connection with place of business, held entitled to enjoin the use of the mark "Little
Tavern" in connection with a place of business-plaintiff proved a secondary meaning
for the mark "Little Tavern" as the name of defendant's eating place in that locality) ;
United Drug Co. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 111 F. (2d) 997 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) (owner
of the mark "Rex" held entitled to enjoin the use of the mark "Rexall," both marks being
used on prescription bottles), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 665 (1940) ; General Shoe Corp. v.
Rosen, 111 F. (2d) 95 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) (owners of the marks "Friendly" and "The
Friendly Five" as applied to shoes, held entitled to enjoin the. use of the marl: "Friendly"
in connection with the sale of shoes, but not entitled to enjoin general use of the marks
"Friendly" and "Friendly Men's Shop" by defendant; on rehearing, 112 F. (2d) 561 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1940), circuit court refused to extend its very limited injunction] ; F. V. Fitch
Co. v. Camille, Inc., 106 F. (2d) 635 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) (owner of the mark "Run-R-
Stop!' held entitled to enjoin use of the mark "Stop-A-Run," both marks used on a
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these results, the repeated denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court-
which at the same time tends to create these results-may be accounted for
stocking preparation-plaintiff proved secondary meaning, extensive confusion, and de-
fendant was also found guilty of using plaintiff's unusual and descriptive packaging and
containers) ; Rinex Laboratories Co. v. Noll, 99 F. (2d) 1013 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938), aff'y
per curiam 25 F. Supp. 239 (N. D. Ohio 1935) (owner of the mark "Pinex" held entitled
to enjoin use of the mark "Rinex," but not to enjoin use of the mark "Fed-Rinex," all
marks used on patent medicines--defendant had failed to introduce evidence that many
marks for similar products had an "ex" ending) ; Industrial Rayon Corp. v. Duchess Un-
derwear Corp., 92 F. (2d) 33 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) (owner of the mark "Spun-lo" held
entitled to enjoin use of the mark "Sunglo," both marks used on fabrics-extensive proof
of actual confusion).
52. Thus, in the case of Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Popular Mechanics, 80 F. (2d)
194 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935), discussed supra note 51, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
rejecting the argument that two of its earlier decisions [Photoplay Publishing Co. V.
LaVerne Publishing Co., 269 Fed. 730 (C. C. A. 3d, 1921), and Barton v. Rex-Oil Co.,
2 F. (2d) 402 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924), reheard, 29 F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928)1 sus-
tained the plaintiff's contentions, stated: "It may be that the decrees went too far in
absolutely enjoining the use of the descriptive words in the Photoplay and Dyanshine
cases for the reason that being descriptive words they could not be exclusively appro-
priated." Id. at 197. It may be noted parenthetically that the Photoplay and Dyanshile
cases were leading authorities used by writers to exemplify the trend towards giving
plaintiffs broad relief in these actions. See, e.g., Handler and Pickett, supra note 3, at
183, 188.
53. See notes 51, 52 supra. It is significant to note that the results of proceedings to
register marks under trademark statutes-a type of trademark action not ordinarily subject
to review by the Supreme Court-indicate an increasing disposition to sustain the demands
of trademark owners that registration be denied the marks of competitors. See, e.g., Parke-
Davis Co. v. Harvey Co., 141 F. (2d) 132 (C. C. P. A. 1944) (the mark "Digiseals" for
use on a digitalis preparation denied registration because of opposition by the owner of
the mark "Capseals Digisortis" for a similar preparation, despite the fact that evidence
showed many trademarks for similar preparations in which the terms "Digi" and "Seals"
were present) ; Jacob Ries Bottling Works, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 138 F. (2d) 56 (C. C.
P. A. 1943) ("Rock Spring Cola" denied registration because of opposition by owner of
the mark "Coca-Cola," although in the Dixi-Cola and Nehi cases, it had been held that the
Coca-Cola Company was not entitled to enjoin the-use of the marks "Dixi-Cola," "Royal
Crown Cola," etc.) ; Architectural Catalogue Co. v. Dodge Corp., 136 F. (2d) 1008 (C. C.
P. A. 1943) (the mark "Architecture and Design" denied registration as a title for a
magazine because of opposition by the owner of the mark "Architectuie") ; Marshall Field
Co. v. Macy Co., 115 F. (2d) 921 (C. C. P. A. 1940) ("Crepglow" denied registration be-
cause of opposition by owner of the mark "Crepetex," although evidence showed many other
marks, both registered and used, containing the word "Crepe"). The Supreme Court has
based its refusal to grant certiorari to these determinations on the ground: (1) that since
they are not final judgments, they will not be binding in subsequent litigation according
to doctrines of res judicata; (2) that the proceedings do not constitute "cases or contro-
versies" within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution because they require the
exercise of legislative and administrative, rather than judicial, functions. See Northwestern
Can ing Co. v. Skookum, 283 U. S. 858 (1931), denying certiorari to 45 F. (2d) 912 (C. C.
P. 7. 1930) ; Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U. S. 693 (1927); Saines
v. Knecht, 212 U. S. 561 (1908). While, a party who is unsuccessful in a Patent
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only by the fact that they were in accord with the Court's views on monop-
oly and competition.5
4
Office Proceeding, may bring a bill in equity in a federal district court as v.el as ap-
peal to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, REv. STAT. §§ 4911-15 (1875), the
Supreme Court has rendered no opinion as to whether it will review federal court decisions
obtained in this manner. But in a number of such cases, it has denied certiorari. Philadelphia
Enquirer Co. v. Coe, 133 F. (2d) 3S5 (App. D. C. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 793 (1943) ;
Dixie Rose Nursery Co. v. Coe, 131 F. (2d) 446 (App. D. C. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S.
782 (1943) ; Century Distilling Co. v. Continental Distilling Co., 106 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A.
3d, 1939), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 662 (1940).
The decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals by their results necessarily
serve to hinder, if not to eliminate, competition and represent a trend contrary to that found
in the decisions of the federal courts, where the issue presented is the right of the plaintiff
to exclude the defendant from itsing the particular mark in question. The principles applied
in the federal courts have been rejected by the Customs Court upon the ground that the
right to register a mark is governed by different considerations than the right to use the
mark-a distinction which, despite repeated pronouncement, appears to be without founda-
tion. See, e.g., the opinions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Jacob Ries Bot-
tling Works, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., supra; ,Marshall Field Co. v. 'Macy Co., sprla; S:elly
Oil Co. v. Powerine Co., 86 F. (2d) 752 (C. C. P. A. 1936). The various circuit courts of
appeals have consequently given little weight in actions involving the right of a plaintiff
to exclude his competitor from use of a mark to prior Customs Court and Patent Office
determinations denying the competitor the right to register the mark. See, e.g., Solventhol
Chemical Products Co. v. Langfield, 134 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943) ; Dixi-Cola Labo-
ratories v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F. (2d) 35 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941) ; Glenmore Distilleries Co.
v. National Distillers Products Corp., 101 F. (2d) 479 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939) ; John Morrell
& Co. v. Doyle, 97 F. (2d) 232 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) ; Fawcett Publications, Inc. V. Popu-
lar fechanics Co., 80 F. (2d) 194 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935). But ef. Century Distilling Co. v.
Continental Distilling Co., 106 F. (2d) 486 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935).
Several recent decisions of the Customs Court, however, indicate a tendency to follow
the trend in the federal courts more closely. See Franco-Italian Packing Corp. v.,Van Camp
Seafood Co., 61 U. S. Pat. Q. 369 (C. C. P. A. 1944) ("Gem-of-the-Sea' allowed registra-
tion over the oppostion of the owners of the mark "Chicken of the Sea") ; Personal Pruducts
Corp. v. Allen Laboratories, Inc., 141 F. (2d) 702 (C. C. P. A. 1944) ("Meds" allowed reg-
istration over the opposition of the owner of the mark "Med-I-Pax," both marks used on
goods of the same descriptive properties).
54. One distinguished commentator has recently expressed perplexity at, and lamen-
tation over, the Supreme Court's refusal to review a number of these circuit court of
appeals decisions because of the interesting questions which these cases presented. See
Derenberg, Trade-Marks Ante Portas (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 829. It is suggested, huw-
ever, that analysis will show that the decisions did not turn upon these "interesting issues."
Thus, the court's opinion in Dixi-Cola Laboratories v. Cola Co., 117 F. (2d) 352 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 629 (1941), reveals that the decision was nut
based upon whether or not ". . . a trade-mark or a part thereof may be lost merely
through public acclaim or public usage despite 'a vigorous fight' by the owner to pre-
serve his right." Derenberg, supra, at 832. Likewise, the decision in American Brahe &
Shoe Foundry Co. v. Alltex Products Corp., 117 F. (2d) 923 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert.
denied, 314 U. S. 631 (1941), was not predicated upon the issue of whether or not a plain-
tiff established a secondary meaning for its mark. Even Derenberg recognizes this, but only
after pointing out that this issue had been presented to the Supreme Court as a reason why it
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Indeed, the opinions in several of the circuit court cases expressly
framed the issues in terms of the monopoly sought by the plaintiffs. Thus
Judge Soper, writing for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in the com-
mercially-important case, Dixi-Cola Laboratories v. Coca-Cola Company,"
stated the issue before the court to be "the broad claim of the plaintiff to
the exclusive use of the word 'Cola' in a trade-mark or trade-name." "
The action involved in part the right of the owner of the celebrated mark
"Coca-Cola" to enjoin the use of the marks "Dixi-Cola," "Marbert Cola,"
and "Marbert, the Distinctive Cola" as the names of soft drink beverages
of the same type as the plaintiff's. The Circuit Court reversed that part
of the district court judgment which granted the Coca-Cola Company a
sweeping injunction against the defendant's use of the word "Cola" in
the indicated marks as well as in any other mark used as the name of the
beverage.57 It held that the Coca-Cola Company was not entitled to the
broad monopolistic claim that it had sought with respect to the exclusive
right to use the word "Cola" as the name of soft drink beverages or to
be the only concern whose product could be used on calls for a cola
drink. The word "Cola" was found, in accordance with the doctrines in
should grant certiorari. See Derenberg, supra at 883. In that case the court expressly found
that defendant's mark in no way contributed to the substitution involved, and therefore
there was not any basis in fact for a contention that the decision in this respect was in-
consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 265 U. S. 526 (1924). But see Derenberg, supra, at 834-35. Finally, in Cridelbaugh v.
Rudolph, 131 F. (2d) 795 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 779 (1943), the
court expressly stated that even assuming the validity of the plaintiff's marks as a valid trade-
mark, he was not entitled to relief against the defendant. Therefore, there was no reason
why, as Derenberg argues, the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari for the
purpose of clarifying the distinction between suggestive and descriptive marks. See Der-
enberg, sitpra at 845 et seq.
55. 117 F. (2d) 352 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 629 (1941).
56. Id. at 353.
57. Coca-Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Laboratories, 31 F. Supp. 835 (D. Md. 1940). This
action was only one of a series of suits by the Coca-Cola Company against a number of
other manufacturers who used the word "Cola" as part of their trademarks. In Pepsi-
Cola Co. of Canada, Ltd. v. Coca-Cola Co., 59 R. P. C. 127 (1942), the English Privy
Council sustained a decision of the Canadian Supreme Court, holding that the Canadian
Coca-Cola Company could not enjoin the use of the mark "Pepsi-Cola" by the American
company's Canadian subsidiary. In Coca-Cola Co. v. Nehi Corp., 25 A. (2d) 364 (Del,
Ch. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 60 U. S. Pat. Q. 345 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1944), the Coca-Cola Company lost
its suit to enjoin the use of the marks "Royal Crown Cola," "Par-t-Pak Cola," etc, As a result
of these decisions and the rulings therein contained, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, in the recent case of Coca-Cola Co. v. Standard Bottling Co., 138 F. (2d) 788
(C. C. A. 10th, 1943), affirmed the granting of a petition to strike restrictive provisions from
a consent decree-entered many years before-enjoining a small bottler from the use of the
marks "Ayer's Cola," "Standard Cola," or "Cherry and Cola." The decree involved in the
Standard Bottling case was typical of a large number of consent decrees obtained by the
Coca-Cola Company in unreported suits against small bottlers during the 1920's and 1930's.
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the Shredded WVheat and Dupont Cellophane cases, s to be both descrip-
tive and generic, as indicating a class of beverages and a type of product
rather than the plaintiff's product alone. Certiorari was denied by the
Supreme Court. 9
A recent decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, with respect
to which certiorari was also denied, similarly discusses the issues in liti-
gations of this character in terms of the relation between monopoly and
competition."0 In reversing a lower court decision which had granted
the owner of the mark, "Chateau Martin," an injunction against the de-
fendant's use of the mark "Chateau Montay," both marks being used on
wine, Judge Frank emphasized "' that the legal protection of trademarks
creates "immunities from competition." H pointed out that the inter-
ests of society and the consuming public, as well as those of the parties
plaintiff and defendant, were involved in the determination made in
actions of this character, since the decisions established the "allowable
extent of monopolies in trade names." 12
An analysis utilizing the approach suggested in this article as the key
to the eptire trend of decisions within the field of trademark and unfair
competition law within the past decade, is to be found in the succinct
statement at the outset of Circuit Judge Frank's opinion on behalf of
the Court:
"The failure to keep constantly in mind the divers policy considera-
tions which, in this legal province, came in conflict with one another
and the consequent occasional over-emphasis on but one of them-
the protection of the interest of the businessman who has built a
business around a name-has sometimes led to decisions unduly ex-
tending the confines of name-monopolies. For a time the courts were
remarkably generous in fixing the boundaries of such monopolies.
See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Triolo (E. D. Mo. 1935) ; Coca-Cola Co. v. Schwartz, Equit. No.
1-120-B (j) (S. D. Cal. 1925); Coca-Cola Co. v. Seltzer & Sons Soda Water Mfg. Co.
(W. D. Mlo. 1924).
Recently the Coca-Cola Company obtained a limited injunction against the use of the
mark "Cleo Cola" as it was then used by the defendant. The court found that it was
using these words in a script and color arrangement, which had been changed periodically
to look more and more like the features of the Coca-Cola mark, and stated that ". . . the
defendant copied the make-up of the plaintiff's trzde-mark as far as it dared, and further
than it should have dared ... " Cleo Syrup Corp. v. Coca-Cola Co., 139 F. (2d) 416
(C. C. A. 8th, 1943).
58. Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85 F. (2d) 75 (C. C. A. 2d,
1936), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 672 (1938), 304 U. S. 575 (1938), 29 U. S. 601 (1936).
59. 314 U. S. 629 (1942).
60. Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F. (2d) 955 (C. C. A. 2d,
1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 758 (1943).
61. Id. at 957.
62. Id. at 959. See also id. at 957-58.
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Today the tendency is to be somewhat less generols. . . . We ap-
proach the case at bar, then, having in mind the basic common law
policy of encouraging competition and the fact that the protection of
monopolies in names is but a secondary and limiting policy." 03
(B) The Use by Non-Competitors of Similar Marks, Whether Words
or Symbols, on Different Goods., In one sense, of course, all goods com-
pete with each other for the consumer's purchases. Goods may, however,
be divided into different classes varying with the number of types of arti-
cles included within the class. Thus, within the classification of beauty
preparations, face powders, lipsticks, and similar cosmetics may be said to
compete with each other for, the purchaser's dollar but face powders are
divided into different classes varying with 'the number of types of articles
used in this sense.
A fundamental question within the field of trademarks and unfair
competition is to what extent the owner of a mark for one product can
enjoin the .use of that mark or a similar one in connection with the sale
of goods different from those which the owner is manufacturing or dis-
tributing. 4 In this discussion it is assumed, of course, that defendant's
mark is of such a character that if it were used on the same goods as
those of the plaintiff, the latter could secure injunctive relief because
only by such an assumption can the scope of the plaintiff's rights outside
of the sphere of his own particular goods be tested.
During the nineteen-twenties a number of circuit courts of appeals, par-
ticularly the Second Circuit, rendered a series of decisions 05 -influential
63. Id. at 959. But cf. G. H. Mumm Champagne v. Eastern Wine Corp., 61 U. S.
Pat. Q. 337 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); George V. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co., 61 U. S.
Pat. Q. 424 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
64. For a comprehensive collection of the cases on this subject and an analysis of
them, see Wolff, Nolo-competing Goods in Trade-Mark Law (1937) 37 CoL. L, REV. 582.
65. See, e.g., L. E. Waterman & Co. v. Gordon, 72 F. (2d) 272 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934)
(owner of the mark "L. E. Waterman & Co." used on fountain pens, entitled to enjoin
the use of a similar Waterman name for safety razor blades) ; Rosenberg Bros. & Co, v.
Elliott, 7 F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925) (owner of the mark "Fashion Park" used in
connection with men's clothing, held entitled to enjoin use of that mark on hats and
caps) ; Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924) (owner
of the mark "Vogue" on a fashion magazine, held entitled to enjoin the use of this mark
on ladies' hats) ; Aunt Jemima Mills v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917)
(owner of the mark "Aunt Jemima," accompanied by the picture of a laughing negress,
used on a self-rising flour for pancakes, permitted to enjoin the use of it for pancake syrup),
cert. denied, 245 U. S. 672 (1918). The Supreme Court has never clearly passed on the issue
presented by these cases, although in one decision, American Steel Foundries v. Robertson,
269 U. S. 372 (1926), it had held that the owner of a mark did not by virtue of that fact alone
have the right to exclude another from registration of a similar mark for goods other than
those of the plaintiff, regardless of the nature of the mark in question and the commonness of
its use. The Court held, on the contrary, that registration should be accorded the mark
"Simplex" as part of a corporate name, although this registration was opposed by an-
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also in some state court determinations 6 -- tending to grant a plaintiff
broad rights to exclude others from using a similar mark upon goods dif-
ferent from those of the plaintiff. Within the past decade, however, the
federal courts dealing with this issue have adopted a far more restrictive
attitude as to the extensiveness of the rights of the owner of a mark.'
other concern having this word as part of its name, on the ground that the word "Sim-
plex" was so common as a corporate name as not to be likely to lead to confusikn Ur
deception.
66. This has been particularly true of the lower New York courts. See, e.g., Phila-
delphia Storage Battery Co. v. 'Mindlin, 163 fisc. 52, 296 N. Y. Supp. 176 (Sup. Ct.
1937) ; Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc.. 147 Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. Supp. 459
(Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd without opinion, 262 N. Y. 482 (1933). But a number of state
courts have not accepted the broad view enunciated in these earlier federal eases. See,
e.g., the interpretation of the Illinois state decisions set forth in Time, Inc. v. Viohin
Corp., 128 F. (2d) 860 (C. C. A. 7th. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 673 (1942), discussed
infra note 67. See also the discussion of the Massachusetts cases in National Fruit Pro-
duct Co. v. Dwinnel-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499, 509 (D. Mass. 1942), aff'd on othcr
grounds, 140 F. (2d) 618 (C. C. A. 1st, 1944). See the discussion inra pages 544-46.
67. Dwinell-WAright Co. v. National Fruit Product Co., 140 F. (2d) 618 (C. C. A.
1st, 1944) ; Durable Toy Novelty Corp. v. Chien & Co., 133 F. (2d) 853 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943)
(owner of the mark "Uncle Sam" used on toy banks selling for between 59i. and $2._50,
held not entitled to enjoin use of the mark "Uncle Sam" on toy banks selling for 10i.), cert.
denied, 320 U. S. 211 (1943) ; Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F. (2d) 663 (C. C. A.
7th, 1943) (owvner of the mark "Philco" used on batteries, phonographs, refrigerators, radios,
etc., held not entitled to enjoin use of the mark "Phill-co" on electrically-operated degreasing
machines) ; Time, Inc. v. Viobin Corp., 128 F. (2d) 860 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) (owner of the
mark "Life" used on a magazine, held not entitled to enjoin use of the marlk "Life" as part
of a slogan on wheat, "Life of wheat"), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 673 (1942); Arr6w
Distilleries, Inc. v. Globe Brewing Co., 117 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941)
(owner of the mark "Arrow" on liquors not entitled to enjoin use of tie marl= "Arrow"
on beer) ; S. C. Johnson and Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 F. (2d) 427 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940)
(owner of the mark "Johnson" used on floor and furniture polishes, not entitled to enjoin
use of the mark "Johnson" on a cleaning fluid for furniture fabrics and woodwork) ; Wal-
green Drug Stores v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 113 F. (2d) 956 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) (owmer
of the mark "Pyrex' on glass containers of various types held not entitled to enjoin use of
the mark "Rex" on prescription bottles), cert denied, 311 U. S. 708 (1940).
The opinions in several other decisions, decided on grounds of laches, contain clear
indications of the disposition to adopt a restrictive attitude towards plaintiff in actiins Loi
this kind. See Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co., 132 F. (2d) S 2 (C. C. A.
2d, 1943) ; Emerson Electric Mfg. Co. v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Cvrp., 105 F. (2d)
908 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 616 (1939).
Two cases which granted plaintiffs relief may be compared with the foregoing authuri-
ties. California Fruit Growers v. Windsor Beverages, Ltd., 118 F. (2d) 149 (C. C. A. 7th,
1941) (owner of the mark "Sun-Kist" used on fruits, fruit juices, and jams, held entitled
to enjoin use of that mark on an orange concentrate for making a svft drink). Contrast,
however, the language of that case with the subsequent approach adopted by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in the later case of Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F.
(2d) 663 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943); Proctor Gamble Co. v. J. L. Prescott Co., 102 F. (2d)
773 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 557 (1939) (owner of the mark "O.ydol"
used as a washing powder for cleaning purposes, held entitled to enjoin use of the marl:
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Particularly Judge Learned Hand-whose earlier opinions gave great mo-
mentum to the trend during the preceding decade-has expressly placed
limitations upon the broad interpretations to which his earlier ruling has
been subjected. Furthermore, certiorari was sought in more than half of
the cases, but the Supreme Court consistently declined to review any of
the decisions.
0 8
One of the most illuminating opinions dealing with the issues in actions
of this character is that rendered by Judge Hand in the recent case of
Johnson & Sons v. Johnson.9 The plaintiff had used the name "John-
son," originally only on a floor wax, and later on a large number of floor
cleaners, lacquers, waxes, and furniture polishes. It had registered this
mark on a number of occasions for general application to its products.
More than forty years after the plaintiff's predecessor had commenced
business, the defendant started business under the name of Johnson Pro-
ducts Company and placed on the" market a cleaning fluid used chiefly for
upholstery and other fabrics, but also for woodwork in connection with
which he used the mark "Johnson." Shortly after the defendant com-
menced to market this product, the plaintiff started to sell one of its pro-
ducts as a cleaning preparation for woodwork and similar surfaces. The
plaintiff proved to the satisfaction of the trial judge-and the circuit court
refused to reverse this finding as erroneous-that the defendant's use of
the name "Johnson" had caused confusion among the plaintiff's cus-
tomers, and further, that the defendant had instructed his employees not
to undeceive any customers who were so confused.
The lower court granted a broad injunction restraining the defendant
from selling his cleaning preparation under a label in which the name
"Johnson's" appeared. On appeal, the circuit court drastically modified
this relief and expressly allowed the use of the mark "Johnson's Cleaner"
in juxtaposition with the legend "made by Johnson' Products Company,
Buffalo, N. Y." Judge Hand pointed out that there was no actual diver-
sion of customers by the defendant, since the latter was the first one to
market a cleaner for woodwork and glazed surfaces and the plaintiff was
the newcomer in that line. Since the plaintiff had not lost any actual sales,
Judge Hand stated that the plaintiff's claim to protection could be based
"Oxol" used on a cleaning fluid utilized for the same purpose-extensive evidence pre-
sented to show actual confusion of various types and that defendant had used its mark
together with the word "doll").
68. Durable.Toy Novelty Corp. v. Chien & Co., 133 F. (2d) 853 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943),
cert. denied, 320 U. S. 211 (1943) ; Time, Inc. v. Viobin Corp., 128 F. (2d) 860 (C. C. A.
7th, 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 673 (1942) ; Arrow Distilleries v. Globe Brewing Co.,
117 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941) ; Walgreen Drug Stores v. Obear-Nester Glass Co.,
113 F. (2d) 956 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 708 (1940).
69. 116 F. (2d) 427 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). As is usually the case with trademark deci-




only upon two other interests: (1) its reputation with its customers;
and (2) the possibility of expanding its business into the sphere where the
defendant had gone. Emphasis was placed by him upon the contingent
and impalpable nature of these two interests and the fact that they were
very different from the plaintiff's right not to have his customers taken
away from him. Most significant was the express rejection of the idea
that actual confusion of the public might be used as a ground for giving
a plaintiff the right to exclude the defendant from entering the market
in question. The public interest in not being deceived and confused, it was
pointed out, gives way to the greater public interest in having free com-
petition and in restricting monopolies:
"The public may be deceived, but he [the plaintiff] has no claim to
be its vicarious champion; his remedy must be limited to his injury
and by hypothesis he has none. There is always the danger that we
may be merely granting a monopoly, based upon the notion that by
advertising one can obtain some 'property' in a name. We are nearly
sure to go astray in any phase of the whole subject, as soon as we lose
sight of the underlying principle that the wrong involved is diverting
trade from the first user by misleading customers who mean to deal
with him. Unless therefore he can show that, in order to hold or de-
velop his present business, he must preserve his identity in the dis-
puted market, he cannot rely upon the second of the two interests at
stake [plaintiff's possibility of expansion]." Io
I
This language, as well as the result reaced by the Court, clearly consti-
tutes a rejection of the arguments made by commentators that a plaintiff
should be entitled to relief merely because (1) the public may be con-
fused or deceived, (2) or the defendant is securing an unearned benefit
and thereby sharing in a good-will which the plaintiff has created,71 or
(3) the "uniqueness" of plaintiff's mark "is vitiated or impaired by its
use upon either related or non-related goods." '2
70. 116 F. (2d) 427, 429 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
71. See, e.g., Callman, supra note 42, at 612: "The thesis I have tried to present is
that one who has used his intellectual, physical, or financial powers to create a commer-
cial product should be afforded judicial relief from a competitor who seeks to 'reap
where he has not sown' . . ."; Schechter, .4 Rational Basis of Trade:ark Protection
(1927) 40 HA v. L. REv. 805, 831: "Our conclusion that the preservation of the unique-
ness of a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for its protection is fortified
by the doctrine that has developed within recent years in German law on this same point."
Note, however, that these views have received favorable reiteration in the dicta of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in the Mishawaka case, discussed supra note 3.
72. Schechter, supra note 71, at 830. It is interesting to note that Judge Vyzanski,
in the recent case of National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-\Vright Co., 47 F. Supp.
499 (D. Mass. 1942), discussed infra pages 544-46, interpreted the meaning of the Jolson
case as it has been presented here. Id. at 499, 505, 506, 503.
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One factor which has become, within the past few years, a most im-
portant consideration in the resolution of questions in non-competitive
goods cases, and one which will undoubtedly become more significant, is the
role played by the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.
Prior to the Tompkins case, the entire field of trademarks and unfair
competition was one in which the federal courts made their own law and
did not deem themselves bound by that of the various states. No differ-
entiation was, therefore, made by them between the source of law applica-
ble to technical trademark infringement suits predicated upon registration
under the Federal Trademark Act, and those causes of action, either for
trademark infringement or unfair competition, based merely upon com-
mon law claims. As a result, the decisional law of this period on the ques-
tion of rights and privileges with respect to non-competing goods con-
tains an intermingling of two analytically distinct bases: (1) language
of the Federal Trademark Acts which gives an owner of a registered
mark merely the right to enjoin the use of colorable imitations of that
mark on goods having the "same descriptive properties" and (2) com-
mon law doctrines of unfair competition.
If under the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, however, federal
law is held to govern claims predicated upon a federal trademark regis-
tration while local law governs common law claims of unfair competi-
tion with respect to the use of that mark by a defendant, the earlier deci-
sions which intermingled these two types of claims may no longer
have any value as precedents. The resolution of questions of the type
already discussed would turn upon the law of one or more states, and
it would be necessary to analyze the decisions of the various states in
order to present trends adequately. On the other hand, if, as the writer
has urged in a previous article,74 federal law should be held to govern all
claims, whether statutory or common law, where federal jurisdiction is
predicated not solely upon diversity, but upon the Federal Trademark
Acts, either exclusively or conjunctively with diversity of citizenship, we
should merely have to consider the trend of developments within the
federal decisions themselves.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 1942 in the cases of Rytex
v. Ryan " and Time, Inc. v. Viobin Corporation,7" had held that claims
for infringement of a registered mark were governed by federal law,
but claims of unfair competition based solely on defendant's use of the
mark in question were governed by state law. Although the writer in the
previous article approved that portion of these decisions which held fed-
73. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
74. Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trademarks and UUinair
Competition (1942) 42 CoL. L. REv. 955, 974-90.
75. 126 F. (2d) 952 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
76. 128 F. (2d) 860 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 673 (1943).
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eral law governed claims of infringement with respect to federally-reg-
istered trademarks, criticism was expressed of these decisions insofar as
they held that unfair competition claims involving the same facts as
infringement issues were governed by the applicable local rather than
federal law.
77
Subsequently, in 1943, the Court expressly reversed those portions
of its earlier decisions 78 with which the writer had expressed disagree-
ment and held that unfair competition claims as well as those of trade-
mark infringement were governed by federal law where the matter at
issue was the right to the use of marks (whether words or symbols) and
jurisdiction of the federal courts was predicated in part at least upon
the Federal Trademark Acts-the 1920 as well as the 1905---even though
diversity of citizenship was also present as a basis for the federal court's
jurisdiction. Having decided that federal law governed all questions with
respect to the use of the marks in suit, the Court, however, adopted the
startling view that this federal law should be limited to that body of law
which existed in 1905, when the first Trademark Act was adopted, and
arrived at this unusual conclusion by the following chain of reasoning:
"What, then, is the meaning of the statements in the cases that Con-
gress 'created no substantive rights' by the Act of 1905 ? In our opin-
ion, such statements are rules of statutory construction, actually used
by the courts to determine what substantive rights Congress did
create. . . . A second meaning, when used in cases in which the Act
does apply, is that in general Congress did not intend to create statu-
tory rights novel in scope, but only to create federal rights of the same
scope as the State common law rights already widely recognized in
1905, and that therefore a federal court interpreting the language of
the Act must seek the usual 1905 State common law rules by making
reference to State decisions throughout the Union as sources of prece-
dent. Thus, courts that have said they were applying 'the common
law' of trade-marks in cases arising under the Act of 1905 have in
fact been interpreting the language of a federal statute by referring to
the same sources they would have used in construing and applying
any term in a federal statute or in the Constitution which had a com-
mon law significance." 79
Acting on this reasoning the Court held that the Aunt Jemina,89 Yale,81
Watern-w 8 2 and other cases handed down since 1917 " could no longer
77. Zlinkoff, supra note 74, at 988-90.
78. See Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F. (2d) 663 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943).
79. Id. at 669.
80. Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917), cert.
denied, 245 U. S. 672 (1918).
81. Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F. (2d) 972 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
82. L. E. Waterman & Co, v. Gordon, 72 F. (2d) 272 (C. C. A. Zd, 1934).
83. See cases collected supra notes 51, 52.
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be regarded as valid precedents because they went beyond the scope of
protection which was commonly given by the courts in 1905, when the
first Trademark Act was adopted.
The Court's freezing of the applicable federal law to that which existed
in 1905, when the statute was adopted, would seem to be wholly unsound.
If that principle of construction were generally adopted, then the Con-
stitution of the United States could be given only that meaning which it
had in 1789, when it was first adopted, and similar arguments might be
made with respect to any legislation. Statutory enactments would cease
to have that flexibility which is achieved by the process of dynamic judi-
cial construction. General statutory provisions would be frozen to the
exact and precise meaning that the words chosen had at the time of their
enactment, rather than the meaning that it would be fair to give them
under the conditions existing at the time a court was called upon to
construe them.
Applying the reasoning of the Court in the Philco case, questions aris-
ing under the 1920 Act would be construed according to the state of the
law existing at that time. A situation would then exist in which the issues
in suits concerning marks registered under the 1905 Act would be gov-
erned by the body of legal doctrine existing at that time, whereas with
respect to issues arising in litigations involving marks registered under
the 1920 Act, a wholly different period of time would be taken for select-
ing the body of legal doctrine upon the basis of which these questions
would be resolved. Such a result would appear to demonstrate decisively
the unsoundness of the Court's construction of general words used in a
federal statute as incorporating solely the body of precedents existing at the
time the statute in question was enacted.
In marked contrast to the views of the Seventh Circuit, as expressed
in the Philco case, are those of the First Circuit Court of Appeals in the
recent case of Dwhiell-Wright Company v. National Fruit Product Com-
pany. 4 In that action the Court, following the ruling of the Seventh
Circuit in the Philco case, as well as the views presented by the writer
in his earlier article,85 decided that federal and not state local law gov-
erned claims of trademark infringement, even with respect to different
goods,81 in a suit where the marks in dispute had been registered under
84: 140 F. (2d) 618 (C. C. A. 1st, 1944).
85. See Zlinkoff, supra note 74.
86. In the court below the plaintiff had asserted a claim for unfair comp-tition as well
as for trademark infringement in connection with the defendant's use of the mark
"Whitehouse." The district court held that although the infringement question was gov-
erned by federal law because of the Federal Trademark Act, the unfair competition claim
involving the same facts was to be determined in accordance with the applicable state law,
National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright to., 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass. 1942). For
a criticism of this conclusion, see Zlinkoff, Some Reactions To The Oponio of Judge Wy-
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the 1905 Act, and the jurisdiction of the Court was predicated in part
upon that Act, although diversity of citizenship was likewise present. But
the First Circuit, unlike the Seventh Circuit, utilized all of the federal
decisions, including those rendered after the passage of the 1905 Trade-
mark Act, in arriving at its construction of this legislation.
In deciding the infringement claims of the parties with respect to the
use of the mark "Whitehouse" on various lines of products, the Court
utilized as precedents those federal cases which dealt with this subject in
terms of unfair competition as well as those where issues of statutory
trademark infringement were present, stating that the doctrines expressed
in these unfair competition cases
" seem to us only a way of stating the application to a particu-
lar situation of the broader rule established by the cases that the basic
test of trademark infringement is whether the goods of the alleged
infringer would be supposed by the kind of people who purchase
them to emanate from the same source as the goods of the complain-
ant." 87
Thus by considering these federal unfair competition cases in arriving
at the proper construction of the meaning of the words "same descriptive
properties" as used in the Trademark Act, the Court, unlike the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, saved these earlier cases from being
completely discarded as precedents. Nevertheless, it gave these earlier
rulings a restrictive interpretation, as it did with respect to its definition
of the statutory language "sane descriptive properties." As a result of
its analysis of all the federal cases, it reached the conclusion that the first
user of the mark "Whitehouse" on tea and coffee was not entitled to
enjoin a second user of that mark upon an entire line of fruit and vege-
table products, including various fruit and vegetable juices. It reached
the conclusion in spite of the fact that the first user had established that
"many persons engaged in business as coffee roasters and tea merchants
also put out fruit and vegetable juices with the same mark and similar
canski in National Fruit Product Co. -. Dwincll-lWright Co. (1942) 32 T. M. REa. 131.
The district court, applying the applicable state law, which was deemed to be that of tassa-
chusetts, where the suit was brought, held that the plaintiff did nut have any cause of action
for unfair competition, although applying federal la, with respect to its registered mark, it
did have a cause of action for infringement. On the defendant's appeal with respect to the dis-
missal of its counterclaim and the relief granted on the plaintiff's infringement claim, the
plaintiff did not appeal from the dismissal of its claim for unfair competition. Dwinell-Wright
Co. v. National Fruit Product Co., 140 F. (2d) 618, 620 (C. C. A. 1st, 1944). Therefore,
the Circuit Court of Appeals did not pass upon the question whether federal ur local law
governed unfair competition claims of this character; but its use vf the federal unfair
competition cases in its construction of provisions of the Federal Trademark Act would
tend to indicate that its views incline towards the adoption of federal rather than local
law as the basis for resolving such claims.
87. Id. at 622.
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labels for both lines." 8s On the ground that blended orange and grape-
fruit juice was a product possessing the "same descriptive properties" as
prune and apple juice, the Court did, however, allow the first user of the
mark "Whitehouse" on these products to enjoin the use of this mark on
the blended orange and grapefruit juice.
The future trend of decisions within this field will obviously be affected
by the determination whether the interpretation of the phrase "same de-
,scriptive properties" used in the 1905 Act is to be that of the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, exemplified by the Philco case, or that of the First
Circuit Court of Appeals, exemplified by the Dwinell-Wright Company
case. The adoption of the first interpretation will necessarily result in a
more restrictive delimitation of the area, within which the owner of a mark
will be granted exclusive rights than would follow from the acceptance of
the broader basis utilized by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. Similarly,
the trend will be affected by whether or not federal or local law is held to
govern claims of unfair competition based upon the use of a mark where
the federal court's jurisdiction over such claims is of a derivative charac-
ter. If local law is held to govern such claims-the view of District
Judge Wyzanski in the National Fruit Product case R--the legal pattern
within this field may well tend to become a crazy quilt varying with trends
in the different state courts. On the other hand, if the view that federal
law governs such claims be adopted, as it was by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in the Philco case, a far more uniform development may
be expected, characterized by the general outlook of the federal courts in
their handling of questions that turn upon the basic issue of the relation
between monopoly and competition.
(C) Claims of Unfair Competition with Respect to Unpatented or
Un opyrighted Business Methods, Systens, or Ideas. Professor Chafee
recently Do described the approach of the federal courts to claims for ex-
clusive rights to uncopyrighted or unpatented business methods, systems,
or ideas, as one traditionally characterized by "Conservatism" rather
than reflective of the policy of "Conquest." 11 Decisions rendered by the
88. Id. at 624.
89. See note 86 supra.
90. Chafee, Unfair Competition (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 1289.
91. Professor Handler had some years before Professor Chafee presented a similar
analysis and prognostication as to the trends in decisional law in the type of unfair com-
petition cases considered in this subsection. Handler, Unfair Compelition (1936) 21 IOWA
L. REv. 175, 189-91: "For one to reap with impunity the fruits of another's labor may
be reprehensible, but the creation of new species of property interests and new series of
monopolies by the courts may be disastrous to free enterprise. . . . Monopolies created
by legislation may be restricted and regulated, so as to operate, partially at least, in the
public interest. Judge-made monopolies find their origin and their regulation in the law
of torts and the protection of the public interest is at best unsystematic and fortuitous,
[Vol. 53: 514
MONOPOLY VERSUS COMPETITION
federal courts during the past ten years' demonstrate a continued ad-
herence to the policy of rejecting such claims. This case law represents
an unequivocal repudiation of the strongly-advocated view 03 that claims
for protection of uncopyrighted and unpatented business methods, sys-
tems, and ideas, should be given judicial recognition by means of an
extension of traditional doctrines of unfair competition. In rejecting
such arguments on the ground that they would foster monopoly rather
than competition, the cases show an even more conservative trend than
Professors Chafee or Handler beford him, ventured to predict.°' Not a
single circuit court decision within the last ten years has sustained the
plaintiff's claims in litigations of this character. There have been thirteen
such cases during the same period of time which have granted judgments
in favor of the defendants and reversed in a number of these instances
lower court rulings in favor of the plaintiff. A study of the opinions
rendered by the various circuit courts in these cases shows that one factor
which has influenced them " has been the policy expressed by the Supreme
Court in the Shredded Wheat case.
In that case; as already shown,"0 the Court not only held that the plain-
tiff was not entitled to enjoin defendant's use of the mark "Shredded
. . . We must look to the legislature for any fundamental change of doctrine and for
the shaping of the compromise which will provide some measure of protection to the
fruits of originality without shackling the competitive system. For myself, I am dubious
whether the price to the consumer may not be too high for any compromise to operate
in the public interest." Contrast these views with those presented in the writings of Call-
man, supra note 42, and Rogers, infra note 93. Compare this language also with that ued
by Judge Hand in the R. C. A. case discussed infra pages 54S-49.
92. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111 (1938) ; Corica v. Ragen, C9
U. S. Pat. Q. 513 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944) ; Gum, Inc. v. Gumakers of America, Inc., 136 F. (2d)
956 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943) ; Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F. (2d) 73 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1943) ; Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F. (2d)
266 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943) ; Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fee & Stemwedel, Inc., 129 F. (2d) 156
(C. C. A. 7th, 1942) ; James Heddon's Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, 128 F. (2d)
6 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 674 (1942) ; Rytex Co. v. Ryan, 126 F. (2d)
952 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) ; American Fork & Hoe Co. v. Stampit Corp., 125 F. (2d) 472
(C. C. A. 6th, 1942); Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. American Fpansion Bolt &
1Mfg. Co., 124 F. (2d) 706 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) ; J. C. Penney & Co. v. H. D. Lee Mercan-
tile Co., 120 F. (2d) 949 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941) ; R. C. A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. (2d)
86 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 712 (1940) ; Grosjean v. Panther-Panco Rub-
ber Co., 113 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
93. See, e.g., Callman, supra note 42; Rogers, Unfair Como'elition (1919) 17 Mica.
L. REv. 490; (1919) 32 Hv. L. P, 566.
94. Chafee, supra note 90, at 1315 et seq.
95. See, e.g., Gum, Inc. v. Gumakers of America, Inc., 136 F. (2d) 956 (C. C. A. 3d,
1943); American Fork & Hoe Co. v. Sampit Corp., 125 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 6th,
1942); Rytex v. Ryan, 126 F. (2d) 952 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942); Grosjean v. Panther-
Panco Rubber Co., 113 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
96. See pages 529-30 supra.
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Wheat," but pointed out that all were free to share in the market that had
been created for the product, even though this market had resulted from
the plaintiff's efforts and expenditures. The Court went even further and
held that the defendant could manufacture and sell the Shredded Wheat
product in the pillow-shaped form which the plaintiff had always used.
Justice Brandeis remarked:
"But the name and form are integral parts of the goodwill of the arti-
cle. To share fully in the goodwill, it must use the name and the
pillow-shape. And in the goodwill Kellogg Company is as free to
share as the plaintiff." 97
There can be no doubt that the underlying factor which has led to the
rejection by the federal courts of the claims asserted by the plaintiffs in
these suits has been their concern with the effect that the granting of such
exclusive rights would have in terms of the creation of perpetual monopo-
lies. The opinion of Judge Learned Hand in the R. C. A. Manufacturing
Company case,"' expresses clearly this fundamental antipathy to the crea-
tion of such monopolies. In that case the court, reversing the district
court, rejected the contention that either record companies or performers
who made records for these concerns could restrain the playing of these
records in a commercial manner by their purchasers. It is important that
the court reached this result even though the state courts in Pennsylvania
had shortly prior thereto held that such commercial use by broadcasting
companies and others constituted "unfair competition." Judge Hand
emphasized that to grant the record owner the right to restrict its sub-
sequent commercial use after it had been sold would be "contrary to the
whole policy of the Copyright Act and of the Constitution. Any relief
which justice demands must be found in extending statutory copyright
to such works, not in recognizing perpetual monopolies, however limited
their scope." "
The court expressly rejected also the argument that the doctrine of
unfair competition expressed in the International News Service case,
100
constituted precedent for affording the plaintiffs the rights that they
sought, limiting that decision in the light of subsequent cases to its par-
ticular facts.01° Arguments based upon "natural rights and property
rights" were also rejected in clear and unambiguous language:
97. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111, 121 (1938).
98. R. C. A. Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940),
cert. denied, 311 U. S. 712 (1940).
99. Id. at 89.
100. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215 (1918).
101. Compare the interpretation of the case law subsequent to the Interntational News
Service case as presented by Callman, supra note 42, Chafee, supra note 90, who expressly
took the position that the International News Service case had to be considered as ". . limited
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" 'Property is a historical concept; one may bestow much labor and
ingenuity which inures only to the public benefit; 'ideas,' for instance,
though upon them all civilization is built, may never be 'owned.'
. . .an author has no 'natural right' even so far, and is not free to
make his own terms with the public. In the case at bar if Whiteman
and RCA Manufacturing Company, Inc., cannot bring themselves
within the law of common-law copyright, there is nothing to justify
a priori any continuance of their control over the activities of the pub-
lic to which they have seen fit to dedicate the larger part of their con-
tribution. We are adjured that courts must adjust themselves to new
conditions, and that in the case at bar justice clearly points the way
to some relief. We cannot agree; no doubt we should be jealous to
execute all reasonable implications of established doctrines; but we
should be equally jealous not to undertake the composition of sub-
stantial conflicts of interests, between which neither the common-
law, nor the statute, has given any due to its preference. We cannot
know how Congress would solve this issue; we can guess--and our
guess is that it would refuse relief as we are refusing it-but if our
guess were the opposite, we should have no right to enforce it." 102
Apparently the question whether local or federal law governed the
issues was not considered and conclusions were based without discussion
upon federal rather than local law. In the light of the history of the
Erie v. Tompkins doctrine in the Supreme Court, this approach would
seem questionable. 0 3 Indeed a number of circuit courts have decided un-
fair competition claims of the character under discussion in this section
-where the basis of the court's jurisdiction was simply diversity of
citizenship-upon the theory that local rather than federal law, now gov-
erns such questions.Y4
to its own subject-matter of news." Chafee, mpra note, 90 at 1314. Moreover, the rea-
sons which Professor Chafee presented as calling for the limitation of the doctrines Uf
the majority in the Intemaional Ncws Sermice case, foreshadowed those presented by
Judge Learned Hand in the R. C. A. M1anufacturnng case: "The general doctrine laid
down in Pitney's opinion would enable the courts to set up a monopoly cunflicting with
the patent scheme provided by Congress and in a situation which the Constitution has
entrusted to Congress alone." Id. at 1314-15. Compare this language, written at a time
when the district court in the R. C. A. case had granted the plaintiff the relief sought,
with the language on this point in judge Hand's opinion (discussed supra page 543)
on behalf of the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's reversal of the lower c.urt.
102. R C.A. Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. (2d) S6, 90 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
103. See the discussion of the history of the Tomphins doctrine in the courts in
Zlinkoff, mpra note 74, at 955-74.
104. Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F. (2d) 25
(C. C. A. 7th, 1943) ; Gum, Inc. v. Gumakers of America, Inc., 136 F. (2d) 957 (C. C. A.
3d, 1943) ; Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. American Expansion Belt Co., 124 F. (2d)
706 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941), discussed in Zlinkoff, supra note 74, at 96246. Like the R. C. A.
Manufacturing case, however, a number of the courts have simply decided the issue on the
basis of federal law without mentioning the Tomphins case. See American Fork & Hoe
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It is, therefore, worth noting that the applicable law, as found by tie
court in a number of these cases, has been characterized by the same trend
already noticed in recent federal decisions. Thus the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals found, in the Addressograph case, 105 that Illinois law required
denial of a plaintiff's claim to injunctive relief against the defendant's
supplying unpatented materials prepared in a form that could be used with
the plaintiff's patented machines. The Court's opinion pointed out that
two Illinois appellate decisions had rejected the doctrines of the Interna-
tional News Service case.' °6 Similarly, in the recent case of Gum v. Gum-
makers of America,107 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that in an
action where the federal court's jurisdiction was predicated simply on di-
versity, the applicable local law governed a claim for unfair competition
based upon alleged deceptive similarity between the plaintiff's chewing gum
and the combination of shape, size, weight, and wrapper color used by the
defendant on its chewing gum. Although Pennsylvania law was, there-
fore, deemed to govern, the Court found no Pennsylvania precedent pre-
cisely in point, and concluded:
"We find that the law of Pennsylvania is consistent with the general
law of unfair competition as reflected in the federal cases. . . It is
our opinion that if a Pennsylvania court were called upon to determine
the law of that state on the point now under consideration, it would
accord with the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the Kellogg Company case. It follows that the complaint
was properly dismissed." 108
Although the trends in the law of trademarks and unfair competition in
the various states cannot be treated within the compass of this article, it
Co. v. Stampit Corp., 125 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942); 3. C. Penney Co. v. H. D. Lee
Mercantile Co., 120 F. (2d) 949 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
105. Addressograph-Multigraph Co. v. American Expansion Belt Co., 124 F. (2d)
706 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).
106. Id. at 708-09.
107. 136 F. (2d) 957 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943).
108. Id. at 960. This decision serves to bear out the prediction in the writer's earlier
article, to the effect that in many instances Erie R. R. v. Tompkins would not create the
difficulties one might suppose because of the absence of local precedents directly in point:
"Repeatedly courts, that have had their decisions reversed for failure to apply local law,
have adhered to their original decisions, declaring that there were no contrary local cases
in point. The position of the federal courts with respect to local law is that of trying to
arrive at the same decision it thinks the state courts would reach if they had the same
issue before them. The entire body of jurisprudence upon which the state courts would
draw is the material out of which the federal court is free to mold its decisions. Like
the state courts it is bound only by stare decisis, and the flexibility for the exercise of
judicial technique which that doctrine allows-as Llewellyn's writings have so repeatedly
emphasized, and which every lawyer who had tried to find non-distinguishable cases knows
at first hand-is amply demonstrated by the decisions that have come from the federal
courts since the Erie case." Zlinkoff, supra note 74, at 966-67.
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is significant that a number of recent decisions on this subject by the high-
est courts of New York and Massachusetts, two commercially-important
States, have rejected claims of unfair competition where these were predi-
cated upon unpatented or uncopyrighted business methods,1 3 or the form
in which the plaintiff's or defendant's article was vended.110 Moreover, the
opinions in these state cases show that they have been influenced by the
trends in the federal cases reviewed above. 11 This trend in commercially
important states is very significant because, as has been indicated, local
law will probably govern unfair competition actions of the character dis-
cussed in this section. Therefore, the future direction of federal decisions
in this field will necessarily be affected by state court rulings.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing review of developments in the fields of patent, anti-trust,
trademark, and unfair competition litigation reveals a similar decisional
trend in each field. It reveals also that the rationale underlying the conclu-
sions reached by the Supreme Court and the various circuit courts of
appeals in their treatment of each of these subjects is fundamentally iden-
tical. This identity of results as well as rationale springs from the identity
of the central problem involved. For at the heart of these suits lies the
problem of determining the extent to which the social policy in favor of
the freest possible competitive economy shall be modified or limited in
109. Germanow-Simon fachine Co. v. Standard Unbreakable Watch Crystals, Inc.,
283 N. Y. 1, 27 N. E. (2d) 212 (1940) : Defendant used a system of numbering its sup-
plies so that they could be used in connection with a cabinet developed by the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's judgment in favor of the plaintiff
and dismissed the complaint upon the ground that what the plaintiff was seeking to appro-
priate exclusively was "a system of doing business." Recent federal decisions were cited
by the Court as its precedents; and the International IVews Service case was given a re-
stricted interpretation.
110. Pocket Books, Inc. v. Mleyers, 292 N. Y. 58, 50 N. E. (2d) 646 (1944). Revers-
ing an Appellate Division decision which had granted the plaintiff an injunction against
the defendant's marketing its product in a form similar to that utilized by the plaintiff,
the opinion of the Court of Appeals reveals the effect which the Shredded Wizcal and
other recent federal decisions have had. Thus, the Court said: "Stated otherwise, by
employing in the design of their own format the several features used by the plaintiff-
elements which had passed into the domain of things public and which gave to the de-
fendants' reprints an appearance similar to the plaintiff's product-fairness in competition
required of the defendants that their reprints convey to the purchasing public information
which identified their product and reasonably distinguished it from that of the plaintiff
[citing, among others, the Shredded Whcat and the GuniaIers cases]:' See also Barrett
v. Goodwin, 50 N. E. (2d) 9 (fass. 1943) [plaintiff may not enjoin defendant's use of a
buckle having an appearance exactly like that of the plaintiff. Since no patent covers the
design, "a competing manufacturer has the right to copy an unpatented article."]
111. See discussion of these cases, sspra notes 103, 109.
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favor of the furtherance of other social policies which may result in the
creation of monopolies of varying degrees. Judicial concern with the
problem of preserving free competition in a world where both freedom of
competition as well as political freedom have rapidly disappeared from
many areas of the globe during the past decade is but a reflection "of the
basic philosophy of our American economy," that competition must be
strengthened and revived, for the "alternative to competition is some form
of concentrated government authority." 112
112. TNEC FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1941) 25.
